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IntroductIon
v
The Cosmos, Images, and Poetry
Poetry and conceptions of the cosmos
Relationships between the cosmic, the human, and the divine
Renaissance texts often express a deep fascination with the relationships between 
the cosmos,1 man, and God. The cosmos, like man, was a sign of the God who 
had created it, although to some degree its perfection, like man’s, was deemed to 
have been spoilt by the Fall. For some Platonizing thinkers, a cosmic hierarchy 
led towards God, so that certain cosmic bodies might, in a sense, be closer and 
more similar to God than others, and might help man to know the divine. It was 
commonplace to observe, after Genesis 1.26, that man was made in the image 
of God; to what extent postlapsarian man still bore resemblance to God was a 
popular but more disputed question, addressed by Renaissance writers from Ficino 
to Calvin, and increasingly controversial in a period of religious schism. Writers 
also explored in what ways God intervened in the cosmos, how man could know 
God, and how he could become more like him. The cosmos and the human body 
also bore some sort of resemblance to one another: both were made up of the four 
elements, earth, air, water, and fire; and for some the world had a soul as man 
did. In addition, human history might mirror nature, whether because both were 
based on a principle of concordia discors [discordant concord], or else because both 
went through cycles. In short, Renaissance writers interrogated in various ways the 
relationships between the cosmic, the human and the divine, and the roles played 
there by similarity, difference, and causality.
Such relationships are fundamental to sixteenth-century theology,2 moral 
philosophy,3 natural philosophy, and medicine.4 They are also central both to the 
spate of vernacular natural-philosophical poetry in late-sixteenth-century France, 
and to French love lyric, with its omnipresent cosmic images and divinities. 
Natural-philosophical poems depict the cosmos and the bounteous goods it 
provides for man; to differing extents they also explain how the cosmos works or 
how man organizes knowledge about it; in addition, describing the cosmos often 
has its justification in the notion that it images the glory and might of its Creator. 
Love lyric implies a relationship between human love and the cosmos, and its 
attribution of divine qualities to the beloved lady can explore the role of the divine 
in human love. Thus sixteenth-century poetry touches, in different ways, upon 
questions about the relationships between the divine, the human, and the cosmic, 
questions which are crucial to a sixteenth-century conceptual paradigm.
2     Introduction
Cosmos and Image analyses depictions of the cosmos in natural-philosophical 
poetry and love lyric, and argues that some poetic presentations of the cosmos offer 
particular insight into possible conceptions of it, precisely because of the generically 
specific ways in which it is explored. I shall suggest that one important characteristic 
of much poetry lies in its use of images and will argue that this is of crucial 
importance for a study of the cosmos since, in some sixteenth-century discourses, 
relations between the cosmic, the human, and the divine were conceived in terms 
of real images or similarities: I aim to show that linguistic images provided a means 
of ref lecting upon the status, nature and implications of ‘real’ or ‘ontological’ 
images. The four chapters of Cosmos and Image will explore this contention through 
case studies of two poems, Guillaume de Saluste Du Bartas’s Sepmaine, ou Creation 
du monde (1578), and Maurice Scève’s Délie (1544). Firstly, this Introduction will 
discuss what is at stake in these analyses, by investigating different ways of writing 
histories of the cosmos, as well as the contours of various domains of sixteenth-
century knowledge, and the specificities of poetic and imagistic presentations of 
that knowledge.
Conceptual paradigms, linguistic ‘outillage mental’, and poetry
Traditional histories of the cosmos or of Christian thought tend to examine 
conceptual changes insofar as concepts are formulated explicitly and reasonably 
clearly, in prose, and most often in Latin. Alexandre Koyré’s classic history of 
the cosmos — From the Closed World to the Infinite Universe — argues that in the 
seventeenth century scientific and philosophical thought underwent a profound 
revolution, in which the ordered, finite, and hierarchical cosmos was replaced by 
indefinite, or even infinite, geometrical space; this narrative is based on thinkers 
who elaborated conceptual systems with crucial differences from previous ones, men 
such as Cusa, Copernicus, Kepler, Galileo, Descartes, Newton and Leibniz.5 Koyré 
thus disagreed sharply with Pierre Duhem, who had believed less in a ‘scientific 
revolution’ than in continuous progress, in which seventeenth-century thinkers 
were deeply indebted to medieval ones.6 Nonetheless, both of these histories are 
linear: they examine systems of thought which in crucial respects are different from 
previous ones, and are considered to have an effect upon later ones. Finally, while 
a history of the cosmos might thus discuss Cusa, Copernicus, and Kepler, a history 
of Christian thought might similarly treat Augustine, Aquinas, and Calvin.7
Sixteenth-century French poetry is unlikely to contribute to this sort of linear 
history of philosophical, scientific or theological views (although Koyré did discuss 
whether the ‘honour of having affirmed the infinity of the Universe’ might be 
attributed to the neo-Latin poet Marcellus Stellatus Palingenius).8 However, I 
would argue that poetry has a role to play in a history which aims to map the 
varied conceptual possibilities of a given period, and which focuses less upon a post-
Enlightenment conception of the ‘idea’ as something which is supposed to exist 
prior to and independently of language,9 and more upon the role of language and 
culture in the formation of world-views. Lucien Febvre suggested that the mentalité 
of a period could be sketched out by looking at its key terms and concepts, its outillage 
mental or ‘thinking tools’.10 In the history of science, the notion of the ‘paradigm’ 
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has been used to denote a set of basic beliefs which determine the terms of the 
questions which ‘science’ poses at a given moment (although ‘paradigm’ has also been 
attributed quite different meanings, such as the methodologies learnt in the course 
of disciplinary scientific training).11 More generally, ‘attention [...] has shifted away 
from tracing linear development in selected sciences toward an endeavor to map 
the whole range of medieval and Renaissance natural knowledge’.12 Furthermore, 
‘constructivist’ or ‘externalist’ histories of science have shifted their attention to 
the social, cultural and linguistic contexts which shape the items of knowledge 
produced. Language-contexts are especially important in the Renaissance, since 
even intellectual activities treating directly the objects of modern-day ‘science’ 
were more or less exclusively language-based in the sense that natural philosophy 
(whether in prose or poetry) involved reading, writing, composing commentaries, 
and summarizing, much more than experiments and measurements.13
Foucault’s episteme also maps conceptual formations and, furthermore, in his 
discussion of the Renaissance, Foucault focuses upon similarity, one of the central 
concerns of this book. Foucault argues that conceptual formations depended in very 
different domains or discourses upon the same epistemic principles, that is, upon 
similarity in the Renaissance period, or identity and difference in the Classical 
period.14 For Foucault, similarity structured Renaissance conceptions of everything 
from God to the smallest cosmic phenomenon. Foucault’s account, although 
thought-provoking, is problematic because similarity is not equally central to all 
Renaissance discourses, and different sorts of similarity were important in different 
ones;15 furthermore, humanist dialectic proposed modes of argument (‘places’) 
involving both similarity (for example, comparatio and similitudo) and difference 
(opposita and differentia).16 I focus upon poetic discourses in which similitudes or 
other forms of image are important, and so one might assume that the role of simil-
arity could be taken for granted. However, it is of fundamental importance that I 
maintain open questions of the extent and nature of the similarity and difference 
between, for example, God and man, since answers to such questions were varied 
and form one of the focuses of this study. I will examine the differences between 
poetic discourses and other ones, rather than their common subordination to any 
overarching structuring principle. In addition, for Foucault conceptual formations in 
the Renaissance depended upon four abstract principles (convenance, émulation, analogie, 
and sympathie) which are present to varying degrees in sixteenth-century language: 
the question whether, and to what extent, such abstract paradigms might structure 
thought is a fascinating one;17 however, while I have signalled the im portance 
of similarity, difference, and causality to my study, I endeavour to address these 
insofar as they are suggested by particular sixteenth-century terms or images.
The political historian J. G. A. Pocock writes that ‘a mentalité is too easily 
alleged if we think only of the normal operations of language and not of the 
speech acts performed within and upon it’, and argues for attention to be paid to 
both language-context and speech acts.18 This objection to mentalities might be 
made in order to argue for a return to ‘classic’ thinkers who fundamentally alter 
the basic terms in which something is discussed, who bring about a ‘paradigm 
shift’. However, acknowledging the differences of particular ‘speech acts’ can also 
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enable us to enrich our understanding of a particular paradigm of thought — or 
mentality — conceived not as a static configuration but as a gradually moving 
nexus of pathways or possibilities. Indeed the model of the paradigm suggests that, 
although ‘revolutionary’ moments or ‘paradigm shifts’ occur, change and variation 
are also possible within a particular paradigm: the basic terms may remain the same 
but questions are formulated and answered differently. Febvre’s notion of mental 
tools can also be interpreted to mean that the key terms or concepts of a particular 
mentalité do not only mean something pre-defined but are also available to do 
something different with. Thus Neil Kenny writes that ‘in the Renaissance, the 
mentality of educated people is not a firm set of specific beliefs. Rather it is, like 
our own, a framework of finite possibilities.’19
In this study I use the term ‘thinking tools’ to mean particular linguistic items 
which are commonly employed to ‘think’ (about man, the cosmos, and God) in 
the sixteenth century but which can be exploited in very different ways in different 
genres and by different writers. I interpret ‘thinking’ to mean ‘ref lecting upon’ in 
a sense which may be more or less direct and explicit.20 In other words, I agree 
with Stuart Clark that early modern authors might adopt a particular set of ways of 
thinking without necessarily making a conscious choice to choose those ones rather 
than the others available.21 Therefore I consider that ‘questions’ of the cosmos might 
be approached indirectly or even unconsciously in texts which do not have as their 
primary or explicit goal an exploration of the relationship between the human, the 
divine and the cosmic.
‘Mapping’ a mentality conceived openly as a nexus of possibilities would be a 
Herculean task: examining all the different possible ways in which the corps politique 
is depicted for example, would be a huge undertaking. Quentin Skinner writes 
that ‘the only history to be written is thus a history of the various statements made 
with the given expression. This — rather than the history of the sentence itself — 
would of course be an almost absurdly ambitious enterprise. But it would at least be 
conceptually proper’;22 in other words, any additional text might provide a slight 
variation on a theme, yet it would be rather difficult to examine all available texts. 
However, if language shapes concepts of, say, the cosmos, then discourses or genres 
which use language differently are likely to be especially valuable in providing 
different insights into conceptual configurations of the cosmos which were possible 
in the sixteenth century: attending to the differences of various discourses or 
genres provides a way of exploring a given ‘mentality’ as a network of possibilities 
or questions as much as of limits or answers. In other words, if ideas are not stable 
non-linguistic entities, unaffected by the language in which they are expressed, 
then it is not logical to conceive the role of ‘literary texts’ as simply expressing ideas 
which pre-exist them in an unchanging form. Instead I would argue that texts 
which we classify as ‘literature’ — rather than ‘philosophy’ or ‘science’ — are not 
only appropriate objects for a history of the cosmos but may also have something 
specific to contribute.
In this vein, Ian Maclean has shown that Montaigne, through the form of writing 
he adopts, contributes something specific to the history of philosophy, something 
which differs from a more systematic philosophy.23 Recent research in sixteenth-
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century studies has demonstrated that texts we attribute to ‘literature’ — or have 
difficulty classifying at all — touch upon concerns also present in ‘philosophical’ 
texts but may treat them in different ways:24 ‘literary’ texts can become objects for 
the history of the cosmos if we understand this history to include not only what 
writers formulated clearly and systematically but also what they expressed more 
indirectly or diffusely. Discussions of the link between style or genre and ‘ideas’ 
are frequent in Montaigne studies, presumably because, firstly, Montaigne creates a 
new genre and, secondly, he is so obviously ref lecting on questions also addressed 
in other philosophical genres. However, I would argue for the inclusion not only of 
Montaigne or Béroalde de Verville’s non-systematizing or fictionalizing prose but 
also of various sorts of poetry: in this book, I intend to show that the history of the 
cosmos can be informed even by love lyric, which does not, of course, explicitly set 
out to describe the cosmos or the Christian God.
Thus my objective is not to provide poetic ‘examples’ of ‘ideas’ — such as, for 
example, cosmic harmony — alongside the prose ones; rather I shall consider that 
the particular stylistic conventions and aims of two poetic genres might inf luence 
their different configurations of important sixteenth-century tools for thinking 
about the cosmos. I propose to examine the genres of natural-philosophical poetry 
and love lyric, considering them as part of a conceptual paradigm of thinking about 
relationships between the cosmic, the human and the divine — that is, a paradigm 
which questions the relationships of similarity, difference and causality between 
those three, in some of the ways outlined at the beginning of this Introduction. 
I will argue that the study of these genres enables us to perceive — within this 
same general paradigm — different possibilities from those offered by other sorts of 
texts. My analysis will be based upon close readings of poems in their stylistic and 
imaginative particularities, and will consider that texts may signify beyond their 
explicitly formulated claims, and might contain meaning about the cosmos even 
when the cosmos is not overtly the object of representation. It is in this sense that 
this book combines literary studies with intellectual history: historical concerns 
overlap with aesthetic and stylistic ones.
As part of my attempt to discern the specificity of particular poems, I shall 
compare them with non-poetic texts and also poetic texts belonging to different 
genres and with different aims from those which are the focus of study. These texts 
belong to various discourses including theology, natural philosophy, medicine, 
and political philosophy broadly conceived. In particular, Part I of this study will 
examine various prose depictions of man and of the body politic; Part II explores 
Italian Neoplatonist prose discourses on love, and the évangélique-inspired religious 
poems and letters of Marguerite de Navarre. These texts will not be interpreted as 
a stable ‘background’ of sixteenth-century thought but as other configurations of 
notions key to a sixteenth-century mentality. The readings of these prose texts are 
more or less prolonged, depending on the degree to which the concerns overlap 
or differ in interesting ways from those in the poems. For example, I consider 
Ebreo’s prose dialogues, the Dialoghi, and Scève’s poetic cycle, the Délie, as different 
explorations of the question of why the perfect divine would love the imperfect 
human.
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By examining the particularity of literary texts in relation to intellectual 
history, my project touches upon an issue explored in Terence Cave’s Préhistoires: 
textes troublés au seuil de la modernité.25 However, my intention is not to offer 
‘prehistories’ of later conceptions, although in my discussion of Du Bartas I do 
brief ly suggest that the problem perceived in his depiction of the body politic 
may constitute one element in the prehistory of a paradigm shift. Instead I will 
concentrate upon Du Bartas’s Sepmaine and Scève’s Délie in relation to possible 
cosmic conceptions in the periods in which these two texts were written. As a 
result, this study does not address the contentious question of what constitutes 
a paradigm shift and what constitutes the logical development of a paradigm:26 
some of my analyses point to ‘pressure-points’ within a given paradigm of thought 
but I do not focus upon whether these foreshadow a more marked future shift or 
simply a variation possible within a paradigm. I aim to enrich our understanding 
of possible sixteenth-century conceptions of relationships between the cosmic, the 
human, and the divine, as well as to provide insights into some aspects of sixteenth-
century Neoplatonism, political thought, and Christian thought. Secondly, 
examining poetic representations of man, the cosmos and God provides me with 
a hold upon one facet of the relationship between literary texts and philosophical, 
religious or ‘scientific’ thinking: I shall explore how a particular kind of poetic 
language formulates ‘thinking tools’ differently, and, conversely, by linking poetic 
language to implicit ‘thinking’ about man, the cosmos, and God, I aim to gain 
understanding of the energies behind some of the most fascinating aspects of two 
sixteenth-century poems.
Generic Specificities
‘Philosophie’, ‘théologie’, and medicine
The representations of the human, the cosmic, and the divine which I shall 
analyse alongside poetry belong to philosophy, theology, and medicine. In the 
following section, I shall brief ly describe the contours of these domains of thought, 
before then proceeding to investigate what the specificity of poetry might be. 
The Renaissance concept of philosophy is a slippery one; Cesare Vasoli has even 
suggested that ‘probably the most typical characteristic of Renaissance thought was 
its constantly changing notion of philosophy, its scope, its purpose, its objects and 
its methods’.27 However, philosophy contained the four disciplines of logic, natural 
philosophy, moral philosophy, and metaphysics.28 Another tripartite conception of 
philosophy divided it into speculative philosophy (metaphysics, mathematics, and 
physics), active or practical philosophy (ethics, oeconomics, and politics), and factive 
or constructive philosophy (for example, agriculture, navigation, and mining).29 
Finally, philosophy was thought to extend to all that is knowable by human 
reason,30 and tended to seek certain causal knowledge.
Natural philosophy involved discussions of both the sublunary and superlunary 
realms of the cosmos; the human was studied not only insofar as his body was 
governed by the rules of nature but also in that his soul was the subject of the 
De anima. Natural philosophy was a particularly important part of philosophical 
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studies at university,31 and at least one third of all Aristotle’s commentators wrote 
on one or more aspects of natural philosophy — more than those who wrote on 
metaphysics, ethics, rhetoric, or politics combined.32 After studying logic, the 
student would move on to Aristotle’s libri naturales, the Physics, the De caelo, the De 
generatione et corruptione, the Meteorology, and the De anima. Less attention was paid 
to the detailed studies of particular minerals, plants, and animals as contained in 
the full Aristotelian corpus;33 after all, the sine qua non of philosophy was usually 
the progress from particulars to universals. Finally, although natural philosophy was 
particularly important in universities, the rise of humanism brought an increased 
emphasis on moral philosophy, that is, on ethics, oeconomics, and politics: the focus 
of attention shifted towards the human realm.34
Classroom teaching involved for the most part a direct reading of Aristotle’s texts 
but commentaries and summaries based on Aristotle’s works were produced for 
private study, in particular concerning the works which were taught at university. 
Some philosophical textbooks expanded upon what was available in the Aristotelian 
corpus. In natural philosophy, other subjects such as technical astronomy were 
added to the traditional subjects contained in the libri naturales.35 Discussions of 
nature were based not only on the works of Aristotle but increasingly also on other 
sources,36 and, as the sixteenth century progressed, some books came to be quite 
un-Aristotelian or anti-Aristotelian.37 In the first half of the sixteenth century in 
particular, Jacques Lefèvre d’Etaples’s voluminous introductory commentaries to a 
number of required philosophical texts were widely read; they used Platonic and 
Hermetic themes freely to supplement Aristotle.38 During the Reformation, there 
was a renewed emphasis on providing surveys of the basic fields of philosophy.39
Works of philosophy were usually in Latin, as were editions of Aristotle’s works 
themselves;40 increasingly, however, textbooks ‘spread beyond the student market, 
notably in the vernacular’.41 Furthermore, commentaries and text-books were not 
the only forms of philosophical writing. For example, while commentaries on 
Aristotle would concentrate on a particular branch of philosophy, more miscellaneous 
philosophical texts were also composed;42 these included popular genres such as the 
problemata which discussed natural particulars;43 other idiosyncratic works took a 
particular theme, such as Girolamo Cardano’s De subtilitate (1550) and De varietate 
(1557).44 Genres such as the histoires prodigieuses informed readers of startling events 
in nature, which were often given a moral interpretation.45 Many philosophical 
texts took the form of discursive prose but, particularly in the late sixteenth 
century, there were also dialogues, poems and Montaigne’s Essais; many of these 
were in the vernacular, and some had a fictional setting or contained other fictional 
elements.46 For various reasons, some of these sorts of texts not only break down 
the divisions of types of philosophy (moral philosophy or natural philosophy) but 
also render impossible any simple division between ‘poetry’ (as a ‘literary’ genre) 
and ‘philosophy’ (as a discursive and factual genre).
Philosophy was considered to be the key element in a global structure of 
knowledge which some believed could be complete, an encyclopaedia or knowledge 
of everything intelligible.47 In a less compartmentalized and atomizing culture 
than our own, close intellectual and institutional ties kept philosophical discourse 
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in touch with a range of other disciplines, including theology, medicine, history, 
rhetoric, grammar, law, magic, astrology, poetry, and history.48 Natural philosophy 
had a particularly close alliance with the practical science of medicine, and was 
studied at university as a general preparation for medicine, especially in Italy.49 
At Paris and most northern universities, natural philosophy was seen primarily 
as a preliminary to theology; students studied philosophy (together with the arts, 
astronomy, and astrology) as the major part of a preliminary arts degree before 
progressing — if they chose to continue their studies — to the higher faculties of 
law, medicine, or theology.50
However, philosophy tended to be differentiated from theology. Many had little 
confidence in the suitability of reason to plumb the depths of faith; Jean Gerson’s 
mystical theology, which would inf luence the French évangéliques at the beginning 
of the sixteenth century, promoted the love of the saviour over the knowledge of 
an abstract deity. Luther would declare that ‘the whole of Aristotle is to theology as 
darkness is to light’.51 Towards the end of the sixteenth century it was increasingly 
common to separate theology from natural philosophy and medicine.52 Conversely, 
attempts to submit Aristotle’s ideas to the higher truths of religion were sometimes 
resisted. Nonetheless, it was generally believed that Aristotelian philosophy had a 
propaedeutic value in grasping some of theology’s mysteries;53 increasingly in the 
Reformation period, textbooks framed natural philosophy as a pious exercise.54
By contrast, outside of university arts faculties, thinkers like Marsilio Ficino, 
Giovanni Pico, and Nicholas of Cusa to varying extents undermined the division 
between philosophy and theology. In his extensive writings, Ficino applied reason 
to religious truth,55 and put forward his version of Platonism as a new theology and 
metaphysics, believing that philosophy should, first and foremost, explain theology 
and moral doctrine.56 The natural theology of Ramón Lull also provided an alter-
native to the separation of theology and philosophy, suggesting that the cosmos 
provided certain signs of the divine.57
Therefore, neat divisions often cannot be made between theological texts 
which treat God, natural-philosophical ones which treat the cosmic, and moral-
philosophical ones which treat the human. Many of the prose texts to be analysed 
here will imply a link between the cosmic, the human, and the divine, or will 
evoke the possibility of such a link by explicitly rejecting it. I will discuss natural-
theological and Italian Neoplatonist thinkers who treat God and the cosmos 
together, and shall compare their representation of the relationship between the 
divine and the cosmic to that in the Sepmaine and the Délie; I will also examine 
Jean Calvin’s concern with separating the divine from the cosmic. In addition, I 
will make reference to various natural-philosophical representations of the four 
elements, as well as medical textbooks. I shall also analyse various texts which treat 
the human realm of politics (part of moral philosophy) but imply a link between 
the human and the cosmic — or a link with natural philosophy. Finally, I shall 
also compare love lyric to religious lyric: here the comparisons are much finer than 
when comparing poetry to Calvin’s writings for example. Thus, there is no hard 
and fast rule for the comparisons to be made between philosophy, theology, and 
literature; nor is there any simple way to distinguish ‘poetry’ from ‘philosophy’ 
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or ‘theology’. In what follows, I shall discuss where we might locate something 
specific which poetry has to offer: I shall suggest that this lies in poetry’s stylistic 
conventions and aims; later in this study I will also identify specificities of particular 
poetic genres and writers.
‘Littérature’, ‘lettres’, and ‘sciences’
The definition of littérature in the Petit Robert privileges the aesthetic: literature 
signifies ‘les œuvres écrites, dans la mesure où elles portent la marque de 
préoccupations esthétiques’.58 Arguably another important aspect of the conception 
of literature, and especially of poetry, is still the post-Romantic one according to 
which ‘literature’ — and especially poetry — expresses intense experiences which 
may be both very personal and also universal. Paul Bénichou offers a version of this 
notion which is much modified in an apparent bid to salvage from both Marxist 
determinism and twentieth-century theories like structuralism the privileged 
relationship between literary expression and the universal: literature relates to the 
particular society in which it was written but nonetheless also enables the ‘collective 
social psychology’ of the society in question to attain new orders of thought which 
transcend history and communicate with humanity of other periods.59
However, as the Petit Robert indicates, the definition of littérature in aesthetic 
terms appears only in the eighteenth century.60 Bénichou similarly refers to an 
entity which he considers to have been born in the eighteenth century, before 
being properly separated off from other modes of discourse and identified as such in 
the nineteenth.61 The term littérature (or litérature) is attested from 1495 but did not 
signify texts with particular aesthetic qualities. Littérature referred predominantly to 
the mastery of reading and writing, the knowledge of texts and authors, or of lettres: 
it referred to a human attribute or capacity rather than to texts. Furthermore, the 
texts to be mastered were those containing all domains of knowledge rather than 
only those which the twenty-first century would define as ‘literary’. Littérature came 
to be a synonym for belles lettres only from 1710, and started to supplant the latter 
only later in the eighteenth century; it was only then that littérature was opposed to 
sciences or philosophie in a way which resembles the differentiations indicated by the 
twenty-first-century counterparts of these terms.62
Similarly, the categories of lettres or bonnes lettres or lettres humaines might be 
predecessors of the modern category of littérature but they do not share its contours. 
In a period in which knowledge of all sorts was very much bound up with books, 
writing of all kinds was conversely associated with knowledge: lettres or res literariae 
referred to the totality of knowledge, to all forms of knowledge. The expression 
bonnes lettres (or bonae litterae) — which was coined in the Renaissance and frequently 
employed — referred to the study or knowledge of respected Greco-Latin authors. 
The adjective suggested first and foremost the superiority of Greco-Latin lettres 
over other (medieval) ones, and Cotgrave translated it as ‘learning’. The Greco-
Latin authors to be studied include not only those we would describe as ‘literary’ 
but also those we would term ‘philosophical’. Since bonnes lettres were so partly in 
contradistinction to scholastic Latin, part of what was ‘good’ about bonnes lettres 
was their style or eloquence; nonetheless, aesthetic qualities were not their principal 
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defining characteristic, as they would be for belles lettres — an expression born in the 
first half (and probably the first third) of the seventeenth century.63
Furthermore sciences, like lettres, could refer to the totality of knowledge, and thus 
the term did not differentiate a domain of certain knowledge from other domains 
of thought or writing.64 Sciences had a secondary sense underlying it etymologically 
— the certain knowledge of things by knowledge of their causes — but it was 
only in the seventeenth century that this second definition became important to 
denote particular domains of knowledge.65 As we have seen, nature, which is today 
the object of natural sciences, was the object of the branch of philosophy entitled 
natural philosophy. Sciences were opposed not to lettres but rather to arts: theoretical 
knowledge — necessarily incarnated in writing — was opposed to skills rather than 
to an imaginative sort of writing.66
The expression lettres humaines emphasized the arts of language more than bonnes 
lettres did. It was based on the expressions studia humanitatis and litterae humaniores 
used by Cicero and other ancient authors to describe an education centred on 
authoritative texts in Greek and Latin. Lettres humaines referred in part to the 
study of grammar, rhetoric, and poetry. Rhetoric in particular had a long history 
of being opposed to philosophy on the grounds that it aimed to persuade in a 
particular context rather than to demonstrate unchanging truths; this conf lict has 
sometimes been described as a prehistory of the notion of ‘literature’.67 However, 
the studia humanitatis also referred to the study of history and moral philosophy.68 
Furthermore, the distinction between the arts of discourse or persuasion, on the 
one hand, and formally valid demonstration, on the other, was rather muddied 
by humanist dialectic, which focused on the topics (traditionally associated with 
rhetoric), and which often took examples for its textbooks from imaginative — or 
‘literary’ — texts.69
Therefore, our twenty-first-century conceptions of ‘literature’ and ‘science’ 
are troubled by an encounter with the very different sixteenth-century habits for 
categorizing writing and knowledge. Sixteenth-century concepts of littérature and 
sciences do not classify modes of writing about the cosmos in the same way as ours 
do. On the other hand, it is entirely possible that Renaissance writers might have 
done something other — or something more — than what they thought they 
were doing: the absence of the post-Romantic category of literature does not 
necessarily mean that sixteenth-century poems have nothing in common with 
what we perceive as literature. However, while one may wish to retain a privileged 
concept of literature like Bénichou’s, I aim here to study different responses to 
historical notions rather than discussing how these might correspond to something 
ahistorical. Moreover, the ways in which sixteenth-century writers perceived their 
own writing is of fundamental importance in shaping the potential specificities 
of various genres, the particular ways in which those genres employed sixteenth-
century outillage mental to represent the cosmic, the divine and the human.
 Terence Cave has argued that critics have overstated the notion that ‘literature’ 
did not exist in the sixteenth century, since poésie and fiction were categories even 
if littérature was not.70 For Cave, ‘literature’ has its own particular role to play in 
relation to history. It can restore to history its ‘mobilité’ by allowing the critic or 
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historian to examine the particular rather than the general. Moreover, literary texts 
do not bear signs of the past passively but often reveal troubles, that is, conceptual 
problems which the period in question was not able to voice explicitly. For Cave, 
this expression of troubles stems from the irreducible difference of each literary text, 
which each literary text insists upon. Nonetheless, the degree to which sixteenth-
century conceptions of poésie or fiction correspond to modern notions of littérature 
is uncertain. Furthermore, while literary texts may indeed express troubles, my aim 
here is to locate specificities of poetry in relation to philosophy and theology, with 
reference to sixteenth-century poetry’s generically determined stylistic features and 
aims.
Specificities of poetry: universals, fictions, metaphors, and images
Poetry was often conceived as a ‘seconde rhétorique’. Thus the main justification 
for poetry, as for rhetoric, was to convey the teachings of moral philosophy.71 
Versification and metre were simply another rhetorical tool, and some poetics 
treatises basically constitute versification manuals. However, during the sixteenth 
century, poetry carved out a separate role for itself to some degree. Thus Thomas 
Sebillet’s Art poétique françoys (1548) describes poetic forms just as the arts de seconde 
rhétorique did, yet it includes rhetorical notions in a text exclusively dedicated 
to poetry rather than including versification rules in a rhetoric treatise.72 The 
rediscovery of Aristotle’s Poetics was instrumental in creating a sense of poetry’s 
distinctive role: poetics did not yet exist when Aldus published the text of Aristotle’s 
Poetics but ‘in one generation [...] Aristotle’s Poetics, together with Horace’s long-
known ars poetica, [...] had established a Renaissance genre’.73 The first Latin 
translation was published in 1498, and Aldus’s Greek edition in 1508; from the 
mid sixteenth century, commentaries on Horace were inf luenced by readings 
of Aristotle, and the two brought into a synthesis, albeit one strongly shaped by 
notions from rhetoric.74
Aristotle’s Poetics implicitly or explicitly rejects some of the poetic genres popular 
in the sixteenth century, including the two upon which this book focuses. It 
describes a certain type of narrative poetry (thus excluding Pindar and lyric poetry) 
and Renaissance discussions tended to take this as a point of departure. ‘Love lyric’, 
a rather anachronistic term,75 was rarely evoked in general discussions of poetry.76 
For Aristotle, the distinction between universals and particulars also meant that 
poetry was distinct from history (often understood in the Renaissance as part 
of moral philosophy).77 Moreover, poetry should not be concerned with natural 
philosophy: Empedocles was not a poet because he described particulars rather than 
universals. Thus Aristotle explicitly excluded from the category of ‘poetry’ one 
of the genres studied here, as well as omitting to discuss the other. In response to 
Aristotle, Renaissance commentaries on the Poetics and the Ars poetica often discussed 
Empedocles and Lucretius, and debated whether astronomy, physics and geography 
could constitute the subject-matter of a poem.78 Nonetheless, in his monumental 
Poetices libri septem (1561), Julius Caesar Scaliger let Empedocles back into the canon, 
together with other philosophical poets. In addition, Henri Estienne published a 
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Poesis philosophica (1573) which contained fragments of philosophical poets including 
Empedocles and Parmenides.79
For Aristotle, the distinctiveness of poetry did not lie in verse; indeed poetry 
written in prose was possible. A new separation of poetry from the art of versification 
was mirrored in school studies,80 although some writers — including Scaliger — 
continued to define poetry as verse.81 Aristotle located the distinctiveness of poetry 
in mimesis, a concept which the Renaissance interpreted in the light of rhetoric, and 
of a rhetorical understanding of Horace, and therefore conceived rather differently 
from the way in which it is now understood: mimesis was generally taken to mean 
imitation of life or of other authors, or a vivid portrayal, an interpretation deriving 
from the rhetorical concept of enargeia.82 Furthermore, the poetic work was to 
provide moral improvement or knowledge as much as pleasure, although varying 
emphasis was placed upon the two.83
A different poetic specificity — with an inherently closer relationship to 
philosophy and even theology — was derived from the Neoplatonist notion that 
poetry depended upon a divine inspiration — or ‘fury’ — and had divine origins. 
The divine furies were discussed at length by Marsilio Ficino, and vulgarized in 
France by Pontus de Tyard’s Solitaire premier (1551) in particular.84 Ronsard voiced 
a similar theory but put poetry in the first place on the metaphysical ladder rather 
than making it subordinate to the other divine furies discussed by Ficino.85 Divine 
inspiration served to distinguish the true poet from the mere versificateur or rimeur, 
and thus, by implication, to liberate poetry from its status as simply a versified 
rhetoric. The notion of a divinely inspired poetry was often thought to mean that 
poetry covered all domains of knowledge, even the theological.86
Divine inspiration was quickly linked to other potential poetic specificities, 
in particular to the importance of fictions or fables.87 The grounding of poetry’s 
distinctiveness in fictions was frequent throughout the sixteenth century, although 
there was variation and change in the relative emphasis placed upon the ‘vérité 
voilée’ [veiled truth] and the pleasure of the fable respectively.88 The veil of fiction 
served to distinguish poetry from history,89 or even from rhetoric.90 The truths 
veiled could be of a natural, religious, historical, or moral nature. For Ronsard, as 
for many others, early poetry had been a ‘théologie allegoricque’, which pointed 
to the religious truths of Christianity.91 Ronsard used mythological fictions to 
reveal and conceal ‘les secrets de nature et des Cieux’.92 The natural-philosophical 
poet Jean-Edouard Du Monin also ‘theorized’ (in a fictionalized setting) a ‘poësie 
philosophique’ in which fiction played an important role.93 Cornilliat and Langer 
(pp. 124–26) suggest that some Renaissance conceptions of poetic invention 
conceived it as perfecting the real world by representing a fictional one.
Isabelle Pantin compares poetic depictions of superlunary objects to prose ones 
in the light of this largely Ronsardian account of poetry’s specificity. She concludes 
that Ronsard represented the superlunary realm in accordance with the specificity 
of poetry — that is, through fables or allegories — whereas later poets abandoned 
this specificity, and simply got their facts wrong without this inexactitude being 
redeemed by poetic features.94 It is certainly true that ‘fables’ or fiction constituted 
the most theorized specificity of poetry in the sixteenth century. Furthermore, 
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Ronsard was more strident about his special poetic role than most, and therefore said 
a great deal about the distinctive function of poetry as he envisaged it, and inspired 
much literary criticism focusing upon his understanding of it. However, fiction was 
not the only potential specificity of poetry in the sixteenth century. Indeed, the 
natural-philosophical poem which I shall study in this book employs very rarely the 
dominant specificity of poetry as theorized by Ronsard and discussed by Pantin95 
— fiction — but has a very marked version of another feature often thought central 
to poetry: imagistic language and, in particular, images of one thing in terms of 
another thing which it resembles.
Poetry was often linked to the ‘imagination’ — the faculty of constructing 
images, or the constructing of images, or the images thus constructed.96 Olivia 
Rosenthal shows that some sixteenth-century poetics treatises imply ‘une sorte 
de communauté de nature entre la poésie (en tant qu’elle est figurée)’ [a sort of 
common nature between poetry (insofar as it is figurative)] and ‘le fonctionnement 
de l’esprit’ [the functioning of the mind] insofar as the latter works by producing 
images.97 ‘Imagination’ was, in many of its senses, interchangeable with ‘invention’, 
that is, with that which a poet or rhetorician ‘found’ in the first stage of creating 
a poem or discourse (inventio); the use of the word imagination suggested that what 
poets were looking for in the process of ‘invention’ was images. Aristotle’s Rhetoric 
had suggested that images could be used in prose but were much rarer, since they 
were proper to poetry.98 In addition, physiology linked the imagination to the 
hot part of the brain and thus to melancholy, associated with poetry, eloquence 
and music. In a Platonic scheme of thought poets — like painters, musicians and 
sculptors — were thought of as ‘image-makers’ since they produced artefacts which 
were images of things.99 The Aristotelian Niccolò Tignosi implicitly recognized 
the importance of images in poetic creation and quoted Horace when elucidating 
De anima III.3.100 Finally, according to Olivia Rosenthal, in the years around 
1550 writings about poetry suggested that it should produce something visual: ‘le 
langage poétique est figuré, il donne à voir’ (p. 411) [poetic language is figurative, 
it produces something to be seen].
Both Du Bellay’s Deffence et Illustration de la langue françoyse (1549) and Ronsard’s 
Abrégé de l’art poétique français (1565) entreat poets to use both descriptions and 
comparisons.101 In other words, poets might both depict a thing visually as itself and 
also represent it through another (probably more concrete) thing. However, poetic 
creativity may often have been less about visually recreating the world than about 
exhibiting metaphorical inventio. Perrine Galand-Hallyn argues that in the sixteenth 
century enargeia often used metaphorical developments to go beyond elaborate 
visual display in support of a narrative.102 Similitudes, comparisons, meta phors and 
analogies were important to both rhetoric and poetry but sometimes associated 
particularly with poetry. It was often thought that poetry could multiply rhetorical 
f igures — which include similitudes and comparisons — more than rhetoric 
could.103 François Cornilliat and Jean-Claude Mühlethaler point to the importance 
of metaphors to poetry.104 In his 1587 preface to the Franciade, ‘Au Lecteur apprentif ’, 
Ronsard says that comparisons, provided they are well used, are ‘les nerfs et tendons 
des Muses’ [the nerves and tendons of the Muses].105 Jacques Peletier Du Mans’s 
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Art poétique (1555) mentions the role not only of allegories but also of metaphors 
and comparisons.106 Finally Simon Goulart, commenting upon a comparison in 
Du Bartas’s Sepmaine, claims that it distinguishes the poet from mere ‘rimailleurs’ 
[rhymers]:107 whereas it was often claimed — especially by Ronsard — that 
fables or fiction distinguished a true poet, here it is a comparison which does so.108
Therefore, images, comparisons and metaphors may play a particularly important 
role in much sixteenth-century poetry. They can also be key ‘thinking tools’. Neil 
Kenny has suggested that outillage mental can include metaphors,109 and Fernand 
Hallyn emphasizes that thinking in the history of science can be conceived as not 
only ‘des processus d’enchaînement de question et de réponses’ [processes of linking 
questions and responses] but also ‘le déploiement et l’adaptation des implications 
d’une analogie’ [the unfolding and adapting of the implications of an analogy];110 in 
Hallyn’s case, the thinkers to be studied are also central to traditional diachronic 
histories, but Hallyn stresses that Copernicus can only be understood in relation 
to his ‘champ synchronique’ [synchronic field], in particular to Renaissance 
Neoplatonism, since his hypothesis ‘émerge ainsi de son milieu culturel, tout en 
étant encore engagée dans ce véritable bouillon de textes, de préjugés, de symboles’ 
(p. 300) [emerges in this way from its cultural context, while still being engaged in 
a veritable mass of texts, of preconceived ideas, of symbols].
If images are indeed important ‘thinking tools’ in some paradigms of thought, 
then poetic discourses which use images extensively might provide insight into 
parti cular conceptual possibilities of those paradigms.111 To give a more concrete 
example, the images of the divine as celestial light, or of human society as a natural 
body, are ‘thinking tools’ available in all discourses, but liable to be developed 
differently in some poetic ones. Therefore I will focus upon the role of particular 
images which were banal commonplaces in the sixteenth century: images of the 
divine in the elemental, of natural bodies in political ones, of the divine in parti-
cularly impressive human beings, and of the divine in the sun. I will argue that 
these commonplaces constitute ‘thinking tools’ for sixteenth-century writers, 
which are developed differently in different texts and discourses.112 Therefore 
Cosmos and Image will operate through close readings: it is of no use to my study to 
simply note the presence of an image; rather I need to explore in detail how it is 
used and what it implies. My purpose is not to provide a catalogue of cosmic images 
as, for example, Anne-Pascale Pouey-Mounou has done in an encyclopaedic study 
of the cosmos in Ronsard’s poetry.113
Poetic Images and ontological Similarities
The conceptual power of imagistic language has been highlighted by modern 
cognitivist theories of metaphor, which show that metaphors are not simply 
ornamental depictions of a pre-existing literal meaning but rather shape our 
thought. David Cowling has powerfully marshalled the insights of cognitivist 
theories in relation to early modern texts, in particular in his argument that Jean 
Lemaire de Belges’s architectural images serve to modify conceptions of the self.114 
However, as I will suggest, imagistic language might play a particularly potent 
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role in the case of sixteenth-century thinking about relationships between the 
cosmic, the divine, and the human, since the conceptual power of images and their 
utility as a thinking tool may be strengthened by an ontological status attributed 
to images.
Images — as metaphors or comparisons — represent one thing in terms of another. 
However, in the sixteenth century, this is also understood to be true of images in 
a very specific sense which goes beyond the concerns of rhetoric or poetics and is 
crucial to conceptions of the relationships between the divine, the cosmic, and the 
human. In his Abrégé de l’art poétique, Ronsard defines poetic invention as using the 
‘imagination’ — or ‘imaginer’ — to represent the ‘Ideas’ or ‘forms’ of all things:
L’invention n’est autre chose que le bon naturel d’une imagination concevant 
les Idées et formes de toutes choses qui se peuvent imaginer tant célestes que 
terrestres, animées ou inanimées, pour après les représenter, décrire et imiter 
(p. 435).
[Invention is nothing other than the good natural disposition/nature of 
an imagination conceiving the Ideas and forms of all things which can be 
imagined, celestial as well as terrestrial, animate or inanimate, in order to then 
represent, describe, and imitate them.]
In ‘imagining’ the Ideas, poetry has a role to play in representing a higher or divine 
truth. Marie-Madeleine Fragonard describes this in terms which refer more directly 
to the ‘image’: ‘pour un poète, la notion d’image qui fonde sa théologie, permet 
de fonder un discours où la métaphore, l’allégorie, la polysémie des signes soient 
révélateurs des êtres, c’est-à-dire, dans un contexte platonicien, une écriture qui soit 
réalité’ [for a poet, the notion of the image which grounds his theology, permits the 
grounding of a discourse in which metaphor, allegory, the polysemy of signs reveal 
beings, that is, in a Platonic context, a writing which is reality].115 Similarly, Frances 
A. Yates explained that for Pontus de Tyard images were linked with a higher 
sort of knowledge than that produced by logic.116 In Italian theory at least, poetic 
activity began with the ‘idea’ or the ‘idol’ (the idea in the form of an image), and 
the ensuing passage from Ideas to objects resembled that of the emanative schemes 
of late Neoplatonists.117
Thus the notion of the image played an important role in explaining the 
function and status of the cosmic and human in relation to God. In Genesis 1.26 
man is said to be made in the ‘image and resemblance’ of God, and this idea had 
been greatly elaborated on by some Italian Renaissance thinkers.118 Furthermore, 
Neoplatonist writers popularized the belief that the cosmos had also been created 
by God to be an image of himself, and some suggested that the cosmos provided 
a hierarchy of images of God.119 God, sometimes called an Imager,120 had created 
the world using images of himself. Jean-Luc Solère explains that ‘l’essor du lexique 
philosophique de l’imaginaire en latin semble lié à celui de la pensée chrétienne’ 
[the rapid development of a philosophical lexis of the imagination in Latin seems to 
be linked to that of Christian thought], and that, for Augustine, the world was an 
‘ensemble d’images’ [a set of images].121 The cosmic and the human quite literally 
provided images of the divine: the cosmos — as an object, rather than in poetic 
representations of it — was an image of the divine. I will refer to such images — 
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images which are things rather than words — as ‘ontological images’ to differentiate 
them from the ‘linguistic’ or ‘poetic’ images which exist in language rather than 
in the world.
However, I make this distinction precisely to explore the ways in which 
‘ontological images’ and ‘linguistic images’ often are not distinguished from one 
another. Linguistic images were ontologically grounded in the imagistic status of the 
cosmos itself; or, to use the terminology I have suggested, ‘linguistic images’ were 
grounded in ‘ontological images’. Poetry produced linguistic versions of ontological 
images. Thus image had different connotations from metaphor, for example, since 
metaphors were usually represented as having an ornamental role. Poetry often 
depicted things in terms of other things; conceiving these depictions as images 
of God or the Ideas — rather than simply as metaphors — meant, as Fragonard 
explains in the quotation above, that poetic discourse had an important role to 
play.122 Creating through images was implicitly analogous to a divine activity, and 
furthermore the poet could reproduce the images which God had created. This 
concept might overlap with that of fictions — which were also supposed to be 
veiled signs of a higher truth — but it had different implications;123 furthermore, 
as we shall see in Part I, some writers, notably Du Bartas, disapproved of Greek 
mythological fictions but not of imagistic language.
Not all images are ‘images’ in the sense described. Man and the cosmos are 
images of God because they were created by God; this causality might be considered 
to progress down a cosmic hierarchy so that the sun is an image of God, and the 
moon is an image of the sun (and by extension of God). However, the ‘image’ of 
human society — the body politic — provided by the natural human body is not 
an ‘image’ in this sense, since neither is causally prior to the other (although perhaps 
they resemble one another because both are supposed to image God). As Augustine 
clarifies in a discussion of Genesis 1.26:
omnis imago est similis ei, cuius imago est; nec tamen omne, quod simile est 
alicui, etiam imago est eius. sicut in speculo et pictura quia imagines sunt, 
etiam similes sunt, tamen, si alter ex altero natus non est, nullus eorum imago 
alterius dici potest. imago enim tunc est, cum de aliquo exprimitur.124
[Every image is like that of which it is an image, but not everything which is 
like something is also its image. Thus, because in a mirror or in a picture there 
are images, they are also like. But if the one does not have its origin from the 
other, it is not said to be the image of the other. For it is an image only when 
it is derived from the other thing.]125
But the alleged similarity between, for example, the bodies politic and natural, 
does not seem to be one of purely poetic ornamentation either. As we shall see in 
Chapter 2, arguments were often based upon this similarity, and some physicians 
believed that it qualified them to comment upon politics. The link between the 
two bodies may be ontological rather than purely figurative or heuristic. A theory 
of the ‘microcosm’ and ‘macrocosm’ was developed primarily out of Platonism, and 
was especially prominent in the ‘occult sciences’, but also appealed to a wide range 
of writers; in its various manifestations, this theory considered that there was a 
relationship of similarity and causality between microcosm and macrocosm.126
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Jean Rousset argued that the relationship between microcosm and macrocosm 
ontologically grounded cosmic images in poetry:
l’ancien cosmos analogique [...] fondait logiquement la validité de l’esprit 
métaphorique reposant sur les similitudes et les correspondances entre tous les 
ordres de la réalité, de la pierre à l’homme et de l’homme aux astres.127
[the old analogical cosmos [...] logically grounded the validity of the metaphorical 
spirit depending upon the similitudes and correspondences between all orders 
of reality, from stones to man and from man to the stars]
However, while the real status of similarities or images might ontologically ground 
poetic images, crucially I would argue that it does not necessarily or logically follow 
that cosmic conceptions were prior to poetic images. A unidirectional causality 
does not necessarily stem from conceptions of the cosmos (‘philosophy’) or God 
(‘theology’) to poetic images (‘literature’). Instead poetic images might provide a 
means to explore the nature, extent, and implications of similarities between the 
human, the cosmic, and the divine. In other words, linguistic images might serve 
to explore the ontological images which they evoke. Cosmos and Image will suggest 
that linguistic images facilitate a ref lection upon the similarities — and differences 
— between image and imaged, and upon the implications of those similarities and 
differences.
Thus the imagistic nature of some poetic language is a particularly promising 
‘poetic specificity’ for this study for two related reasons: firstly, I examine a paradigm 
of thought in which, in varying ways and to varying extents, similarity is important; 
secondly, I analyse the relationships — between the cosmic, human, and divine 
— in which questions of similarity are crucial. In conceptual frameworks like that 
dominant in the sixteenth century, the conceptual power which we understand to 
inhere in imagistic language generally can operate together with a power deriving 
from the (culturally specific perception of ) the ontological weight of images.
It has been suggested that, for Scève and late-sixteenth-century poets, images 
are no longer able to refer to reality, so that poetic language is self-referential 
and creates a parallel world, rather than imaging the real one.128 By contrast, in 
Cosmos and Image, I will suggest that images do refer to the world, although they 
do not simply reproduce it. In some cases, the link between a particular image and 
reality — or, to put this differently, the ontological status of a particular similarity 
posited by a particular image — is undermined, and I aim to analyse when and 
how, and what the consequences are (see for example my discussion of images of 
love in Chapter 2). Elsewhere, I suggest that images explore the nature and degree 
of the similarity posited, or its implications. For example, in Chapter 1, I show 
how Du Bartas uses linguistic images of the elemental to investigate the nature of 
the similarity between God and the cosmic, in particular the fraught question of 
the relationship between the Holy Spirit and wind. Du Bartas also highlights how 
warfare can be used to analyse cosmic discord, and the similarity between the two 
has far-reaching implications in a period of civil war (Chapter 2).
Thus images do not create a parallel poetic universe with no link to the real 
one, but nor do they simply passively ref lect ontological conceptions. Rather they 
explore dominant interpretations of the world and, while they transform it to 
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some degree, these transformations constitute a mode of questioning similarity, 
difference, causality, love, and hate in the relationships between the human, the 
cosmic, and the divine. Of course there are differences in the sorts of reference 
implied by the two genres of natural-philosophical poetry and love lyric: the 
cosmos is central to the subject matter of the former, whereas the latter describes 
desire for a lady. However, as I shall discuss in Part II, in some love lyric a particular 
combination of reference and fiction enables the poet to explore the cosmos in a 
generically specific way.
Finally, by exploring divine, cosmic and human relationships through an 
examination of images, I also aim to contribute to a history of the image, not that 
which treats which images were used at a given moment, but a history concerned 
with the role which images play in relation to thinking and to the representation of 
reality. I will also touch upon how this role relates to sixteenth-century notions of 
the function of images. For the time being, I wish to make two points about them. 
Firstly, although ‘image’ had a particular sense, it was not necessarily differentiated 
from ‘images’ supposed to be purely ornamental. Renaissance categories do not 
oppose and distinguish uses of imagistic language on the basis of whether they 
are supposed to have ontological status. Thus Du Bartas’s commentator Pantaléon 
Thévenin uses the term similitude — which can mean a linguistic ornament — to 
describe a representation which is a very common example of a possible ontologically 
grounded image: the representation of God as the sun. Thévenin writes that the 
poet ‘monstre par une similitude prise du Soleil comme Dieu crea toutes choses 
sans se pener aucunement’ [shows by a similitude drawn from the Sun how God 
created all things without exerting himself at all].129 We may take this to mean that 
it is uncertain whether particular images play the role of ontological images or not; 
I shall suggest in this book that the possibility of this role makes images particularly 
powerful (and certainly not purely ornamental) but that ultimately they do not 
simply ‘ref lect’ in a passive way the thing which they represent.
Secondly, despite glorifications of the imagination — or fantaisie130 —, there 
were also many indictments of it. There were fears that the image would become 
too distant from that which it ‘imaged’, that the imagination would less reproduce 
that which it ‘imaged’ than transform it. Indeed Grahame Castor suggests that the 
notion of imagination was probably even more damaging to poetry than that of 
fiction (p. 136). In the sixth essay of his commentary In Rempublicam, published in 
1534 and 1542,131 Proclus had warned against poetry which made use of the imagi-
nation (‘celle qui est mêlée d’opinions et d’imaginations’), arguing that it might 
represent reality in an illusory way, that it was inferior to other kinds of poetry, 
and that it constituted the poetry which Plato wished to banish.132 The image-
making faculty might deceive by producing images never seen, as well as those from 
sensations already experienced and processed; the imagination might exert a great 
transformative power, and this was dangerous as well as fascinating.133 Similarly, 
‘imaginations’ in a linguistic or cultural form could sully conceptions of God, or 
transform conceptions of the cosmos. After giving the description of invention 
quoted above, Ronsard almost immediately proceeds to warn against the unhealthy 
imagination which would represent monstrous forms in a disordered fashion:
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Je n’entends toutefois ces inventions fantastiques et mélancoliques, qui ne se 
rapportent non plus l’une à l’autre que les songes entrecoupés d’un frénétique, 
ou de quelque patient extrêmement tourmenté de la fièvre, à l’imagination 
duquel, pour être blessée, se représentent mille formes monstrueuses sans ordre 
ni liaison (Abrégé, pp. 435–36).
[However I don’t mean those fantastical and melancholic inventions, which are 
no more connected with one another than the disrupted dreams of a lunatic, 
or of some patient extremely tormented by fever, in whose imagination, 
because it is sick, are represented a thousand monstrous forms without order 
or connection.]
Such imaginations are the product of a sick mind, the ‘imagination’ as faculty of 
cognition gone horribly wrong.134 Cosmos and Image will not examine the trans-
formative power of images upon conceptions in these terms; however, it will 
examine their transformative power, and will eventually return to sixteenth-
century fears regarding the imagination to suggest that the roles of the images 
examined may give us some insight into those fears.
du Bartas’s Sepmaine and Scève’s Délie
Part I of Cosmos and Image will examine one natural-philosophical poem, Du 
Bartas’s Sepmaine, and Part II a collection of love lyric, Scève’s Délie. The Délie and 
the Sepmaine might seem like a surprising pair of texts. Firstly, they were published 
thirty-four years apart: Du Bartas first published his Sepmaine in 1578, while the 
Délie had been published in 1544, the year of Du Bartas’s birth. The Délie might 
therefore be termed a ‘pre-Pléiade’ poem and the Sepmaine a ‘post-Pléiade’ one. 
In addition, given that I examine the relationship between God, man, and the 
world, the doctrinal differences between the two poets might be significant: Du 
Bartas was a Protestant whereas we are reasonably sure that Scève was not, and his 
Délie was composed before Reformation churches and their doctrines were firmly 
distinguished from one another.135
Furthermore, just as this is not a study of the inf luences of prose texts upon 
poetic texts, nor is it a chronological account of a supposed progression from the 
Délie to the Sepmaine. The different periods in which the two texts are written 
will be crucial: the Wars of Religion play a role in the Sepmaine, and French 
évangélisme and Italian Neoplatonism in the Délie. Interest in particular images may 
be inf luenced by the historical position of the poet: I shall suggest that Du Bartas’s 
position as a peace-loving and constitutionalist Huguenot affect his poetry, and that 
Scève’s interest in évangélique discourses might inf lect his. However, the poems are 
examined as two fascinating examples of the conceptual configurations possible, 
rather than as part of a linear narrative.
Both the Délie and the Sepmaine were accompanied by visual images, at least in 
some editions: emblems in Scève’s case, and pictures of the Creation in Du Bartas’s, 
one of which adorns Cosmos and Image. Such illustrations could depict the cosmos, 
and also provide an image of one thing in another thing. However, these literally 
visual images exceed the concerns of this study, which focuses not upon the visual 
aspects of images but upon other particularities of specifically linguistic images, 
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including, for example, not only the depiction of one thing as one other thing but 
also the semantic slippage between a nexus of related meanings (Chapter 1).
The two poems have been chosen firstly because both poets write — albeit very 
differently — in striking imagistic ways, and secondly, because, I will argue, in both 
cases these images ref lect upon a concern with relationships between the divine, 
human, and cosmic.136 Therefore I make only very brief references to other poems 
by Scève and Du Bartas in which images arguably do not play the same role. Scève 
himself wrote a Christian natural-philosophical poem — the Microcosme (1562) — 
which could be compared to the Délie but I concentrate upon the Sepmaine because 
of the role played there by images. As will gradually emerge, further points of 
comparison between the Délie and the Sepmaine will be the interest they express 
in the potential role of love in the cosmos, and, secondly, their concern for the 
closeness — or distance — between, on the one hand, the cosmos and the human 
and, on the other, the divine.
Natural-philosophical poetry and love lyric are not monolithic any more than 
‘the’ sixteenth-century mentality, and I shall focus upon only one ‘example’ of each: 
Du Bartas’s Sepmaine and Scève’s Délie. I would not claim that Du Bartas’s poetic 
practice is representative of sixteenth-century or even ‘baroque’ poetry, nor that 
the Délie is typical of love lyric. However, these examples serve as case studies: I 
hope that my work will be of assistance in understanding what is at stake in some 
other texts of the period, and will occasionally make some suggestions in this 
direction, in particular in relation to Agrippa d’Aubigné’s Tragiques and Marguerite 
de Navarre’s Chansons spirituelles; however, rather than being representative of their 
genres as a whole, the poems in question demonstrate individual appropriations of 
certain ‘thinking tools’, and thus present the world in particular ways.
I will focus on the Sepmaine in Part I and the Délie in Part II. Chronologically 
speaking, therefore, this book might seem to be written backwards. One could 
justify this through a model of writing history backwards, or through Terence Cave’s 
concept of the ‘prehistory’; however, while the two poems do mutually illuminate 
one another to some extent, it is the chronologically earlier poem, the Délie, which 
might be argued to render more manifest a threat which is more implicit in the later 
poem, the Sepmaine: namely, the absence of a redeeming divine. This, I argue, is 
due to the generic difference of the Délie. Indeed, more generally, the justification 
for the order of Cosmos and Image has less to do with chronology than with genre. 
I begin with a poem which sets out to describe the cosmos and to perceive God 
within it, then I move on to a poem which has a rather different expressed purpose: 
to describe the effects upon the je of his beloved, ‘les mortz qu’en moy tu renovelles’ 
[the Deaths which in me you renew]. The genre of the Sepmaine means that it is 
in a sense at one less remove from some of the prose discourses with which it is 
compared. In Part I, I study questions of resemblance and difference between the 
cosmos, man and the divine in a context in which this ‘divine’ is the Christian God 
rather than a fantasy lady upon whom both religious and erotic desires are focused; 
I explore issues in Part I which will arise in very different forms in Part II.
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terminology
There is no very obvious solution to the problem of what to call the ‘images’ or 
‘metaphors’ studied, that is, the representations of one thing in terms of another 
thing to which it may be similar in some way. The available terms — in both 
their modern and sixteenth-century senses — are problematic since they assume a 
priori answers to questions which I wish to remain open. For example, ‘metaphor’ 
is usually assumed to mean something purely ornamental; nor do I wish to specify 
that I am using it in the sense of cognitivist linguistics, since in sixteenth-century 
poetry some of the ‘metaphors’ or ‘images’ discussed may derive significance from 
(the perception of ) their ontological weight rather than solely from the conceptual 
power understood to inhere in imagistic language generally.
I have chosen to use the term ‘image’. I mean by this not simply a visual 
representation but a representation of one ‘thing’ which is also a sign of another 
‘thing’. Furthermore, I do not assume a priori that poetic images — that is, the 
image in poetry of one thing as another thing — only repeat ontological ones, for 
example the poetic image of the divine as the sun might not simply passively echo 
the notion that the divine is ontologically imaged as the sun. Instead, such a poetic 
image might itself ref lect upon — and affect — conceptions of the relationship 
between the divine and the cosmic sun. Indeed I shall suggest that poetic images 
often explore such relationships, and that they impact upon notions of the divine, 
the human and the cosmic. However, the term serves as a reminder of a dominant 
sixteenth-century conception of ‘images’, that is, as real ref lections of God: there 
are suggestions in both poems studied that such images are present, either in the 
cosmos, or in the lady who ref lects divine light; however, we shall see that these 
suggestions are also undermined or rendered problematic, and that images may 
come closer to ‘inventions’ in the modern sense.
notes to the Introduction
 1. Like ‘universe’, the word ‘cosmos’ is sometimes taken to mean just the heavens, the superlunary 
or celestial realm. However, in Cosmos and Image, ‘cosmos’ and ‘cosmic’ refer to the whole of the 
physical world, both the superlunary and sublunary realms; where necessary, I use ‘celestial’ to 
distinguish the realm of the heavenly bodies from the sublunary.
 2. In addition to theology’s general concern with man’s relationship to God, man could — 
according to natural theology — use the cosmos and himself to know God.
 3. Conceptions of man could involve his position in relation to the cosmos: see Jill Kraye, ‘Moral 
Philosophy’ in the Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy, ed. by Charles B. Schmitt and 
Quentin Skinner (Cambridge: CUP, 1988), pp. 303–86. The Cambridge History of Renaissance 
Philosophy is referred to hereafter as CHRP.
 4. For example, fundamental to both natural philosophy and medicine is the belief that man’s body 
is governed by the same processes as the cosmos.
 5. Du monde clos à l’univers infini (Paris: Gallimard, 1973). Koyré did consider ‘scientific’ thought 
to be bound up with philosophy and religion: see the introduction to his Études d’histoire de la 
pensée scientifique ([Paris]: PUF, 1966), pp. 11–15. Nonetheless, this is as part of a revolution-based 
history. Similarly, important historians of philosophy (or of ‘ideas’), including Lovejoy, have 
examined manifestations of ‘thought’ other than those of philosophy understood in a restricted 
and intellectualist sense: see Donald R. Kelley, The Descent of Ideas: The History of Intellectual 
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History (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2002), pp. 263–89. Nonetheless, the point is to situate changes in 
thought as part of a linear history. Cf. my comments on Pocock below.
 6. In particular, his encyclopaedic Système du monde: histoire des doctrines cosmologiques de Platon à 
Copernic, 10 vols (Paris: Hermann, 1913–59) includes thinkers from Pythagoras to Paul of Venice, 
and covers a wide range of medieval writers. On the conf lict between continuity and revolution 
in the history of science, especially Duhem and Koyré, see Kelley, Descent of Ideas, pp. 209–20.
 7. For example, Alister E. McGrath’s Historical Theology: An Introduction to the History of Christian 
Thought focuses successively upon groups of theologians from the patristic, medieval and 
Renaissance, Reformation and post-Reformation, and modern periods (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1998). See also Geoffrey W. Bromiley’s Historical Theology: An Introduction (Edinburgh, T. & 
T. Clark, 1978). Justo L. González — who writes a history of ‘Christian Thought’, rather than 
of ‘theology’ — focuses upon theologians like Zwingli, Luther, and Calvin but also discusses 
at more length writers who would not be described as theologians, or not exclusively as 
theologians, such as Erasmus (pp. 21–28) and even Galileo and Descartes as part of a ‘changing 
philosophical setting’ (pp. 318–46); nonetheless these are writers who expressed new systems 
of thought in relatively clear fashion, and are considered as part of linear history (A History 
of Christian Thought, 3 vols (Nashville, TN: Abingdon Press, 1975), iii: From the Protestant 
Reformation to the Twentieth Century).
 8. Du monde clos, pp. 37–43 (p. 37).
 9. See in particular Kelley. In this study I will avoid the term ‘idea’ in order to avoid implying the 
traditional ‘unit-idea’ as something stable and pre-existing its appearance in any particular text 
or discourse.
 10. Le Problème de l’incroyance au XVIe siècle: la religion de Rabelais (Paris: Albin Michel, 1942). Kelley 
explains that German Begriffsgeschichte shares with French historians of mentalités the ‘effort to 
reconstruct an intellectual field through the history of terms and families of terms’ (Descent of 
Ideas, p. 303); see also pp. 235–36, 293–96. Although initially formulated in response to Rabelais, 
mentalités have often been associated with the study of low culture: I do not use the term in this 
sense here — I am of course studying literate culture.
 11. Paradigms became a focus of study after the publication of Thomas S. Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific 
Revolutions in 1962, which uses the term with some quite different senses: 2nd edn (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1970). The multivalent concept has been used in differing ways 
since, not necessarily in accordance with Kuhn’s view of the best way to study the history of 
science. See Jan Golinski, Making Natural Knowledge: Constructivism and the History of Science 
(Cambridge: CUP, 1998), pp. 14–27. Kelley compares (brief ly) the paradigm to the mentalité, the 
episteme, and the Weltanschauung (Descent of Ideas, pp. 213–14).
 12. Anthony Grafton and Nancy Siraisi, introduction to Natural Particulars (Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press, 1999), pp. 1–21 (p. 7).
 13. Hence Ann Blair’s essay on natural philosophy for the The Cambridge History of Literary Criticism, 
9 vols pub. (out of 11) (Cambridge: CUP, 1990–), iii: The Renaissance, ed. by Glyn P. Norton 
(1999), pp. 449–57. Kelley writes, ‘The sharpest of literary turns have been made by scholars who 
seek to re-create pre-scientific mentality, in which metaphor, myth, and what Fernand Hallyn 
called a “vertical”, or qualitative (as distinguished from a “horizontal” or empirical) meaning of 
phenomena, still functioned in natural philosophy’ (Descent of Ideas, p. 229). On the increasing use 
of non-bookish methods of natural philosophy in the Renaissance, see Blair, ‘Natural Philosophy’, 
in The Cambridge History of Science, 5 vols pub. (out of 8) (Cambridge: CUP, 2003–), iii : Early 
Modern Science, ed. by Lorraine Daston and Katharine Park (2003), pp. 365–406 (pp. 384–90).
 14. Les Mots et les Choses: une archéologie des sciences humaines (Paris: Gallimard, 1966).
 15. See in particular Ian Maclean, ‘Foucault’s Renaissance Episteme Reassessed: An Aristotelian 
Counterblast’, Journal of the History of Ideas, 59 (1998), 149–66. See also id., ‘The Process of 
Intellectual Change: A Post-Foucauldian Hypothesis’, Arcadia, 33 (1998), 168–81. It seems to me 
that it is not unhelpful once again to draw attention to the problems of Foucault’s Renaissance 
episteme since, despite its problems, it is still cited, for example in some footnotes to natural-
philosophical poems, in order to ‘explain’ the appearance of cosmic analogies.
 16. For example, Rudolph Agricola, De inventione dialectica, ed. by Lothar Mundt (Tübingen: M. 
Niemeyer, 1992), pp. 144–79; first pub. 1515.
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 17. An analogous question is asked by cognitivist theories of metaphor: particular metaphors can 
be creatively developed but limited by conceptions of other things, by other metaphors; and 
there may be superstructures of basic metaphors, often spatial and directional, into which other 
metaphors fit.
 18. ‘The Concept of a Language and the métier d’historien: Some Considerations on Practice’, in The 
Languages of Political Theory in Early-Modern Europe, ed. by Anthony Pagden, (Cambridge: CUP, 
1987), pp. 19–38 (p. 29). Cf. Carlo Ginzburg’s criticism of the ‘tentation sociologique’, which 
consists in counting the number of appearances of particular words or ideas rather than analysing 
the different ways in which they are appropriated: see Roger Chartier: ‘Histoire intellectuelle 
et histoire des mentalités: trajectoires et questions’, Revue de synthèse, 111/12 (1983), 277–307 
(p. 294). Pocock uses the terms ‘language context’ or ‘langue’, in contradistinction to ‘speech act’ 
or ‘parole’. I prefer the term ‘discourse’. ‘Language context’ or langue can be misleading as these 
words may refer to the language used, French, for example. More importantly, langue implies 
the overall structure of the language available rather than a mode of representation which may 
not exist in isolation. By contrast, ‘discourse’ refers to different sorts of language which may 
come into contact with other ones (as in the novel, the context in which Bakhtin elaborated the 
term). Moreover, ‘discourse’ serves to denote both a particular way of representing something, 
for example, the cosmos, and also a particular genre, for example late-sixteenth-century French 
natural-philosophical poetry: it thus points to the way in which particular genres may imply 
particular views of the world; the implications of this link between genre and world-view are of 
crucial importance to the questions asked and the assertions made within this study.
 19. The Palace of Secrets: Béroalde de Verville and Renaissance Conceptions of Knowledge (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1991), p. 241. By contrast, Febvre arguably formulated the concept of a mentalité 
in order primarily to sketch the limits on Rabelais’s thought, to counter claims that he was an 
atheist by arguing that such a position was not a conceptual possibility during his lifetime. His 
section entitled ‘outillage mental’ is about the tools which, he argues, would be necessary for 
a certain sort of philosophical thought, and which the sixteenth century lacked (pp. 384–400); 
see also the section entitled ‘Carence d’outils et de langage scientifique’ (pp. 421–26). Whereas 
Febvre discusses ‘les mots qui manquent’ (pp. 385–88) [the words which are lacking], Kenny’s 
examples of outillage mental are words which sixteenth-century writers had, such as arrester, 
meslange, and diversité.
 20. Thus the term ‘thinking tools’ is preferable for my purposes to the Kuhnian notion of questions, 
since the latter would probably imply an explicit formulation.
 21. Thinking With Demons: The Idea of Witchcraft in Early Modern Europe (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1997).
 22. ‘Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas’, in Meaning and Context: Quentin Skinner 
and His Critics, ed. by James Tully (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1988), pp. 29–67 (p. 56): see 
especially pp. 54–63.
 23. Montaigne Philosophe (Paris: PUF, 1996).
 24. Philosophical Fictions and the French Renaissance, ed. by Neil Kenny (London: Warburg Institute, 
1991); Kenny, Palace, pp. 158–209.
 25. Geneva: Droz, 1999.
 26. When introducing the notion of a paradigm, Kuhn mentions figures such as Copernicus, 
Newton, and Einstein, but in 1969 he noted that he intended the term ‘revolution’ to apply even 
to frequently occurring changes in communities which might number no more than twenty-
five specialists; since Kuhn ‘microhistories’ have become the norm. See Golinski, pp. 26–27.
 27. ‘The Renaissance Concept of Philosophy’, in CHRP, pp. 55–74 (61).
 28. Brian P. Copenhaver and Charles B. Schmitt, Renaissance Philosophy (Oxford: OUP, 1992), pp. 
52–53.
 29. William A. Wallace, ‘Traditional Natural Philosophy’, in CHRP, pp. 201–35 (pp. 210–11).
 30. Wallace, p. 209.
 31. Wallace, p. 213.
 32. Blair, ‘Natural Philosophy’, in Cambridge History of Science, iii, 372.
 33. Copenhaver and Schmitt, p. 213.
 34. Vasoli, pp. 58–67.
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 35. Copenhaver and Schmitt, p. 13; Charles B. Schmitt, ‘The Rise of the Philosophical Textbook’, 
in CHRP, pp. 792–804.
 36. Alfonso Ingegno, ‘The New Philosophy of Nature’, in CHRP, pp. 236–63; Blair, ‘Natural 
Philosophy’ in Cambridge History of Science, iii, 372–79.
 37. Schmitt, ‘Rise’.
 38. Schmitt, ‘Rise’, p. 795.
 39. Schmitt, ‘Rise’, pp. 796–801.
 40. Copenhaver and Schmitt, pp. 11, 35.
 41. Ann Blair, The Theater of Nature: Jean Bodin and Renaissance Science (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1997), p. 16.
 42. Kenny, Palace, pp. 37–54.
 43. Ann Blair, ‘The Problemata as a Natural Philosophical Genre’, in Natural Particulars: Nature and 
the Disciplines in Renaissance Europe, ed. by Anthony Grafton and Nancy Siraisi (Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press, 1999), pp. 171–204.
 44. For a more extensive coverage of different kinds of natural philosophy in the Renaissance, see 
‘Kinds of Natural Philosophy’ in Blair, Theater, pp. 14–48.
 45. Jean Céard, La Nature et les prodiges: l’insolite au XVIe siècle, rev. edn (Geneva: Droz, 1996).
 46. Kenny, Palace, pp. 37–54.
 47. Kenny, Palace.
 48. Copenhaver and Schmitt, pp. 20, 58–59.
 49. Wallace, pp. 205, 231–33.
 50. Copenhaver and Schmitt, pp. 11–12; Vasoli, pp. 57–58.
 51. Copenhaver and Schmitt, pp. 42–43. On Gerson and sixteenth-century French thinkers 
including Jacques Lefèvre d’Etaples, see Yelena Masur-Matusevich, Le Siècle d’or de la mystique 
française: un autre regard. Étude de la littérature spirituelle de Jean Gerson (1363–1429) à Jacques Lefèvre 
d’Étaples (1450?–1537) (Milan: Archè; Paris: Edidit, 2004).
 52. Céard, Nature, pp. 437–38.
 53. Vasoli, pp. 70–71.
 54. Blair, ‘Natural Philosophy’, in Cambridge History of Science, iii, 379–84.
 55. Ingegno, p. 239.
 56. Vasoli, pp. 66–69.
 57. Charles H. Lohr, ‘Metaphysics’, in CHRP, pp. 535–638 (pp. 543–44).
 58. Paul Robert, Le Petit Robert, ed. by A. Rey and J. Rey-Debove (Paris: Dictionnaires Le Robert, 
1990), p. 1103.
 59. ‘Réf lexions sur la critique littéraire’, in Le Statut de la littérature: mélanges offerts à Paul Bénichou, 
ed. by Marc Fumaroli (Geneva: Droz, 1982), pp. 3–21; repr. in Variétés critiques de Corneille à 
Borges (Paris: José Corti, 1996), pp. 271–92.
 60. Philippe Caron, Des ‘Belles Lettres’ à la ‘littérature’: une archéologie des signes du savoir profane en 
langue française (1680–1760) (Louvain and Paris: Éditions Peeters, 1992). Marc Fumaroli, L’Age de 
l’éloquence: rhétorique et ‘res literaria’ de la Renaissance au seuil de l’époque classique (Geneva: Droz, 
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 61. Le Sacre de l’écrivain, 1750–1830. Essai sur l’avènement d’un pouvoir spirituel laïque dans la France 
moderne (Paris: J. Corti, 1985), 2nd ed.
 62. Caron, pp. 162–84.
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PA rt I
v
The Cosmos In Du Bartas’s Sepmaine: 
Images Of God And Of War
Introduction
‘Scientific Poetry’: diverse representations of cosmic causality
The second half of the sixteenth century witnessed the f lourishing in French of 
poetry which focused upon the objects of natural philosophy, that is, upon cosmic 
phenomena and cosmic processes. However, the poems differ greatly from one 
another, in particular concerning their representation of causality, that is, the 
ways in which they account for cosmic change. In addition, the poems highlight 
differing subject matter: God is more present in some poems than in others, and 
some describe the whole cosmos whereas others discuss only the heavens or only 
a particular type of natural-philosophical object (as in Rémy Belleau’s Pierres 
Precieuses). Therefore it is difficult to define the genre or its sub-groups without 
misrepresenting the depiction of the cosmos in some poems.
Albert-Marie Schmidt, who brought these poems to the attention of scholars 
in the first half of the twentieth century, designated them as ‘poésie scientifique’.1 
The name continues to be used but it is generally agreed to be anachronistic and 
unsuitable, since — as I discussed in my Introduction — our concept of ‘science’ 
did not exist, and the term had a very different meaning within a very different 
organization of knowledge. To a twenty-first-century reader, natural-philosophical 
poems constitute a remarkable reminder of our distance from the late sixteenth 
century, and of the non-essential nature of our own classification of knowledge 
and discourse: these poems strike us as strange; we cannot fit them easily into our 
categories of ‘literature’, ‘science’, or ‘religion’.
However, although these poems all surprise us primarily for the same reason (that 
they versify natural philosophy, or ‘science’), this should not conceal from us the vast 
differences between them. Some critics have attempted to provide definitions of the 
genre in its entirety but these tend to be based on selective readings of the corpus. 
Jan Miernowski suggests that ‘scientific poetry’ is defined by a combination of 
fiction and causal explanations which are brought together in an attempt to ‘capter 
le divin’ [grasp the divine].2 However, the various poems manifest extremely varied 
attitudes towards fiction and causal accounts.3 In fact, as I have suggested, poems 
within the genre differ enormously in assessing the correct way of representing the 
cosmos and causality.
When it is necessary to refer to all of these poems as a group, I would propose 
‘cosmic poetry’ or ‘natural-philosophical poetry’ as relatively unproblematic; none-
theless, for the twenty-first-century reader these terms do not suggest the imbri-
cation of nature and the divine found in some of the poems, even though the divine 
played an important role in many forms of sixteenth-century natural-philosophical 
writing. Isabelle Pantin’s term ‘poésie du ciel’ solves this problem but does not 
represent the entirety of the genre since many ‘natural-philosophical poems’ do 
not discuss the celestial realm in isolation but rather the whole cosmos or solely 
sublunary phenomena.
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Odette de Mourgues suggested dividing the genre into three broadly chronological 
groupings: poems of the first category — which include Jacques Peletier Du Mans’s 
Amour des amours (1555), Ronsard’s Hymnes (1555–56), and Maurice Scève’s Microcosme 
(1562) — proudly display encyclopaedic knowledge; the second type represents 
the fragmentation of a previously unified view of knowledge and the cosmos, 
and includes Jean-Antoine de Baïf ’s Premier des Meteores (1567) and Belleau’s Pierres 
Precieuses (1576); finally the third group is constituted of those poems which express 
a renewed religious aspiration, such as the Sepmaine (1578) and its many imitations.4 
De Mourgues’s tripartite classification is more convincing than proposed definitions 
of all cosmic poetry, since it distinguishes poems in terms of their subject matter, 
including the relative centrality of God.
However, De Mourgues’s taxonomy does not consider the types of argument 
or discourse used to account for cosmic phenomena and change. For example, in 
Ronsard’s Hymnes, fiction is extremely important: processes of cosmic transformation 
are explicated by myths, notably the amorous adventures of the Olympian gods. By 
contrast, Scève’s Microcosme (which De Mourgues classifies with Ronsard’s Hymnes) 
presents causal explanations in proper rather than allegorical terms (although it does 
frame these with the fiction of a prophetic dream which Adam recounts to Eve). 
Furthermore, Jean-Edouard Du Monin — who writes after Du Bartas — attributes 
a reasonably important role to fiction or allegory, whereas Du Bartas is extremely 
wary of it.5 Finally, Baïf ’s Premier des Meteores and Isaac Habert’s Trois Livres des 
Meteores presumably both fall into De Mourgues’s second category (since they 
discuss only one part of the universe), but they use predominantly the proper terms 
of Aristotelian natural philosophy, and in this sense resemble Scève’s Microcosme far 
more than the amorous mineral mythologies of Belleau.6
Since cosmic poems differ so greatly, my analysis of the Sepmaine cannot be taken 
as representative of the genre as a whole. However, it should be considered in the 
light of the brief survey of it outlined above, insofar as the Sepmaine plays a role 
in implicit debate about, firstly, the correct way to describe cosmic causality, and, 
secondly, God’s relationship to the cosmos. My reading will focus upon images, 
that is, upon a mode of representation which provides an alternative to both the 
proper terms of Aristotelian natural philosophy and also the mythological terms of 
Ronsardian fictions. It is for this reason that I propose to examine the Sepmaine. In 
addition, the Sepmaine was by far the most popular and inf luential cosmic poem (as 
well as the most criticized at a later date): there were at least seventy-three French 
editions of Du Bartas’s works between 1574 and 1590, and at least two hundred 
between 1574 and 1632;7 the poem inspired a f lurry of imitations (by both Catholics 
and Protestants),8 two commentaries by the Protestant pastor Simon Goulart and 
the Catholic Pantaléon Thévenin, and translations into English, Dutch, Latin, 
German, Italian, Polish, Danish and Swedish.9
the Sepmaine: Imagistic representations of the divine and the Elemental
Images are fundamental to the poetic style of the Sepmaine. As part of a particularly 
pronounced ‘baroque’ style,10 Du Bartas often lists different images for the same 
object. Images do not always correspond clearly to a particular phenomenon or to 
32     Introduction to Part I
a particular section of the argument. Sometimes one image, or group of related 
images, seems to direct the movement of the poem. Some individual images are 
developed at length in the form of epic comparisons: the poet considered himself to 
be imitating — at least in part — the epic,11 and, whereas Ronsard tends to employ 
only discursive epic comparisons imitated directly from an ancient text, Du Bartas 
also invents his own.12
However, this stylistic practice is not used to describe all objects. Images depict 
primarily that which is not available to the human senses: underlying cosmic 
processes (the elements and prime matter), God, the soul, and the internal organs 
and workings of the human body. Images ref lect, in part at least, Du Bartas’s 
unwillingness to provide definitive causal accounts for that which cannot be 
perceived by the senses. The poet does not distrust sensory information but it is 
not available for all subject matter; Du Bartas does not claim that therefore we can 
know nothing about such subjects, but he often prefers not to be too authoritative 
in the knowledge he presents.13 One solution he finds is to list several explanations 
rather than deciding upon one: sometimes these are definitely alternatives and 
each is introduced by ‘soit que’;14 elsewhere the causes are apparently not mutually 
exclusive, and each cause may be introduced by ‘puis que’ or ‘car’.15 Another 
solution to the lack of knowledge about imperceptible processes seems to be to 
represent them through images rather than through definitive causal arguments.
Therefore some sections of the Sepmaine are much more imagistic than others. 
The representation of animals, birds, and plants, for example, is stylistically very 
different from that of underlying cosmic forces. In the case of the former, the genus 
is broken down into its species, which are catalogued in lists, not unlike those of the 
works which Du Bartas probably consulted, such as Pierre Belon’s Histoire de la nature 
des Oyseaux (1555) or Pliny’s Natural History; the poet also lists causes and effects, 
very often the uses that the various species serve for man. Images are employed only 
intermittently for visible phenomena, whereas they tend to dominate the depiction 
of the invisible.16
Part I of Cosmos and Image will examine those ‘objects’ which the Sepmaine 
represents imagistically. This corresponds to my concern with not only the 
specificities of imagistic language but also the divine, the cosmic, and the human. 
Images represent the divine. They also depict the cosmic forces and matter which, 
according to sixteenth-century physics, underlie all cosmic phenomena. Of 
course descriptions of specific cosmic objects, such as a particular type of bird or 
plant, also play a role in the poet’s conception of the cosmos; however, arguably 
underlying cosmic forces are of central importance for this, as well as constituting 
the more usual material of natural philosophy. Finally, the human soul also belongs 
to the category of the invisible, and the human body is discussed at length with 
reference to the four imperceptible elements which govern all cosmic phenomena. 
These images render visual that which the reader might otherwise have difficulty 
picturing but also, I shall suggest, serve to explore similarity and causality in and 
between the divine, the cosmic, and the human.
Chapter 1 will analyse elemental images of the divine, especially as wind and 
water. Chapter 2 examines images of cosmic forces, focusing on the depiction of 
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elemental discord as human warfare, and of the human body as the body politic. 
The human soul is discussed in Chapter 1, and the human body — as well as human 
society — in Chapter 2. Thus, Chapter 1 considers objects of theology, and Chapter 
2 objects of natural philosophy. However, my heuristic separation of theology and 
natural philosophy will be belied by a poem in which conceptions of God and of 
the cosmos are inextricably intertwined. As will become clear, the consequences of 
this intertwining will be crucial to the claims made in Part I.
During the course of Part I, I will discuss theological writings by Jean Calvin 
and others, political literature including that of Huguenot resistance theorists, 
discussions of ‘vicissitude’, and poetry, especially Agrippa d’Aubigné’s Tragiques and 
Pierre Du Val’s De la Grandeur de Dieu. These texts have been chosen because the 
Sepmaine touches upon similar questions to those which they address, and employs 
similar commonplaces or outils mentaux, but ultimately does so to different effect. 
In other words, these other texts serve to situate the Sepmaine’s depiction of the 
world in relation to those of contemporary or near-contemporary writers, and 
also to highlight its specificities. Therefore I do not examine all facets of the other 
texts but focus on their treatment of matters which also arise in the Sepmaine. For 
example, although it has already been shown that in general the Huguenot Du 
Bartas’s thinking differs from Calvin’s,17 in Chapter 1 I focus on Calvin’s discussion 
of the imago dei in order to pinpoint Du Bartas’s difference from him on this issue, 
which the poet explores through images.
Finally, since my primary concern is to consider the Sepmaine as a case study of 
an imagistic poem, I shall refer to Du Bartas’s other poetry only occasionally and 
brief ly. Indeed since a key difference between the first and second ‘Weeks’ lies in 
the greater importance of narrative and the more explicit treatment of theological 
points in the latter, and since the dual narrative and descriptive aims of the former 
are crucial to the issues I analyse within it, the Seconde Semaine offers a striking 
contrast to the Sepmaine which within the scope of this study it will only be possible 
to indicate occasionally.
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ch A P t E r 1
v
Poetry and Theology: 
Images of the Divine
Pour mieux contempler Dieu, contempler l’univers1
[To contemplate the universe in order to better contemplate God]
ontological Images of the divine
God, the Creation, and the cosmos: Mosaic physics and natural theology
Du Bartas rarely engages directly with theological problems in the Sepmaine. 
Nonetheless, like theology, the poem is about God, and God’s relationship to his 
creation; furthermore, I shall suggest, it approaches, in a ‘poetic’ or ‘imagistic’ 
way, some of the questions posed by theology. It is crucial to remember that the 
dominant modern distinction between religion and science is foreign to sixteenth-
century ways of thinking about the relationship between the divine and natural 
philosophy: the discussion of natural philosophy was not necessarily perceived as 
separate and distinct from that of God and of his creative act. This is underlined by 
two late Renaissance phenomena: Mosaic physics and natural theology.
In the late Renaissance, attempts were made to create a ‘Mosaic’, ‘sacred’, or 
‘Christian’ physics by grounding natural philosophy in a literal reading of the 
Bible, especially of Genesis. The Bible was seen as a source of natural-philosophical 
knowledge to supplement or, in some cases, to replace Aristotle. Such arguments 
are made in particular by Protestants. For example, the Calvinist Lambert Daneau 
writes a Physica Christiana (1576) which aims to show that the knowledge of physics 
is contained in the Bible, and that everything in the cosmos exists for the glory 
and praise of God.2 The Physica Christiana thus has something in common with 
the hexaemeral endeavour, and indeed places some lengthy extracts from patristic 
hexaemera prior to its contents page.
Unlike his fellow Huguenot Daneau, Du Bartas makes limited references to 
Scripture, and does not explicitly allude to a ‘Christian physics’ or structure his 
work as a response to questions asked in physics.3 However, the poet’s Catholic 
commentator Thévenin implies that the claims of Mosaic physics could be made in 
relation to the Sepmaine: he asserts that his tabulation of the poem’s contents shows 
that ‘toute la physique qui oncques fut escrite et pourpensee, gist, et consiste en ce I. 
ch. du Gene’ [all the physics which was ever written and judged, lies, and consists in 
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this first chapter of Genesis].4 Much of the physics which Du Bartas describes in fact 
has no clear correlative in the Bible; but then that was often true of ‘Mosaic physics’.5 
Du Bartas’s very project of depicting and explaining cosmic phenomena as they are 
created implies that we can know the cosmos by recounting its creation, and that 
natural-philosophical knowledge is present in Genesis. The crucial point here is that 
Du Bartas’s evocations of physics are prompted by the Biblical creation narrative, 
which, in sixteenth-century France, could be seen as a genuine path to natural-
philosophical knowledge rather than simply as a narrative device to present it.
If natural-philosophical knowledge could be gleaned from the Bible, it was also 
proposed that knowledge of the divine could be derived from the cosmos; once 
again, this is alien to a dominant modern distinction between religion and science. 
The cosmos — and individual cosmic phenomena, including and especially man — 
were images of God because God had created the cosmos precisely to be an image, 
or ‘mirror’, of himself; the effects of the Creation (the cosmic and the human) bore 
witness to their cause (the divine). Thus cosmic and human things were what I have 
termed ‘ontological images’ of the divine: that is, cosmic and human things stood in 
for the divine; by contrast, where ‘linguistic images’ of the divine are concerned, it 
is words referring to the cosmic and the human which stand in for the divine.6
The status of cosmic and human phenomena as images of God meant that they 
could play a crucial role in natural theology, that is, in the rational knowledge 
of God using arguments from nature without the need for faith or Scripture. 
Calvin frequently described the imago dei and the manifestation of God’s glory 
in the cosmos, and the theme generally had great appeal with Protestant writers, 
particularly in apologetic writing in the last quarter of the sixteenth century and 
in the seventeenth century.7 Similarly, Du Bartas emphasizes his desire to perceive 
God in the cosmos, evoking this project much more directly than that of Mosaic 
physics. At the beginning of the Sepmaine, the poet — in an apostrophe to God, a 
sort of prayer — outlines his objectives. He appeals to God for help in his poetic 
task, and expresses clearly his aim to narrate the creation of the cosmos, to describe 
the created cosmos, and to perceive God’s presence within it.8 Furthermore, 
Du Bartas does not get very far in his narrative before restating these natural-
theological aims at great length: seventy lines later, he emphasizes that the cosmos 
bears the marks of its Creator, and a long list of comparisons suggests that God’s 
image is painted ‘sur le front’ [on the brow] of his creation, that the universe is a 
‘mirror’ or ‘manteau’ [cloak] for God, a school where God’s ‘honneur’ is taught, a 
staircase which gradually elevates us to the heavens, a room where God’s riches are 
displayed, a bridge which permits us to cross the sea of divine mysteries, a cloud 
through which God’s divinity shines, a theatre where his qualities play their roles, 
and a book in which his ‘admirable artifice’ can be read (97–154).
It is telling to note why the poet returns so quickly to the issue of perceiving 
God in the cosmos. After the initial prayer mentioned above, Du Bartas commences 
the narrative of the Creation. Evoking the role of the Trinity in the Creation, he 
alludes to the simultaneous sameness and difference of its three persons (65–75). He 
then reproaches himself for addressing this question, suggesting it can bring about 
the ‘shipwreck’ of the cognitive quest (76–88) by depending too heavily upon 
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reason (79). The Trinity represents a deeply difficult, meaningful and risky issue, 
and the poet would rather love it than analyse it (90–98).9 He prefers not to try to 
ascend to the heavens or contemplate God face to face, but rather to examine his 
creation in order to perceive him within it (97–154).
Thus Du Bartas chooses natural theology over another possible form of theology. 
The description of the cosmos is necessary to the poet’s aim of knowing God since 
he expresses profound doubts concerning attempts to do so by reasoning about his 
trinitarian nature. In addition, like Calvin and other Calvinist poets, Du Bartas 
also rejects the other extreme of considering the cosmos as an object in itself: as 
for Calvin, perceiving God in the cosmos is a middle road between, on the one 
hand, trying to contemplate God directly and, on the other, viewing the cosmos in 
itself rather than in its relation to God.10 Therefore, the dual generic nature of the 
Sepmaine (hexaemeral and natural-philosophical) is, for Du Bartas, fundamental.
The image of God
Opinions about the potential of natural theology varied greatly. It was generally 
agreed that humankind was unable to read the book of nature properly because 
of the Fall; thus the second book of Scripture was necessary. However, some 
emphasized this limitation more than others. The fifteenth-century writer Ramon 
Sabunde was very positive about the possibilities of natural theology, inferring from 
the cosmos not only the existence of God but also the doctrines of the Trinity, the 
Creation, and the Fall and Redemption of man. Sabunde’s work is preserved in 
many MS and printed editions of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, and was 
famously translated by Montaigne.11 However, although popular, it is unlikely that 
readers accepted all of its ideas, even if many were less sceptical than Montaigne. 
Late sixteenth-century Protestant apologists used Sabunde without following him 
in all points.12
For Calvin, man could deduce God’s existence from the cosmos, and thus had 
no excuse for ignoring it; however, Calvin suggests, fallen man cannot gain further 
knowledge of God through nature alone. The necessity of supernatural revelation, 
Scripture, and faith are central to the Protestant Reform. Other Protestant writers 
including Philippe Duplessis-Mornay,13 Pierre Viret and Pierre de La Primaudaye14 
similarly stressed limits upon natural knowledge of God. Nonetheless, the Protestant 
theologians Melanchthon, Bullinger and Bucer do not go as far as Calvin’s emphasis 
upon man being ‘almost blind’,15 and Zwingli and his followers also differed from 
Calvin on this point.16 In the genre of Protestant apologetic writing which began 
to be important in the last quarter of the sixteenth century, some writers highlight 
less than Calvin the limits upon the natural knowledge of God, and display a greater 
confidence in reason, since they are not assuming a reader who shared their faith; 
these writers certainly used not only Calvin but also Sabunde.17 The Théologie 
naturelle of the Protestant minister Georges Pacard (1574) is less strict than that of 
Duplessis-Mornay.18
As Jan Miernowski and Josiane Rieu have observed, Du Bartas’s depiction of 
natural theology also differs from that of Calvin.19 His images of the cosmos as 
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a theatre, a school, a mirror, a room, an image, and a garment are familiar from 
the first book of Calvin’s Institution de la religion chrétienne and the preface to his 
commentary on Genesis.20 However, he seems more confident than Calvin in 
the power of cosmic phenomena to serve as images of God, insofar as he omits 
to mention the Fall in this context, and indeed mentions it relatively rarely in the 
Premiere Sepmaine;21 by contrast, according to both Jacques Pineaux and Albert-
Marie Schmidt, Calvinist poets usually emphasized the dependence of the natural-
theological project upon acquaintance with the Scriptures, thanks to God’s grace 
and Christian revelation.22 As Rieu points out, Du Bartas’s project of describing 
cosmic objects as he narrates God’s creation of them means that he is able to confuse 
the postlapsarian world with the prelapsarian one in which nature is still a readable 
book, and man is still a perfect image of God.23 The omission of the Fall from the 
poet’s discussion is in line with his general practice in the Sepmaine of avoiding 
complicated and potentially controversial theological issues; however, it is also 
crucial in justifying his double project of writing about the cosmos and God.
Calvin does say that ‘les plus rudes et idiots’ manage to read something in the 
book of nature (Institution, I.v.2) but elsewhere claims that ‘readings’ by those without 
faith and Scripture produce false beliefs and thus take them further away from God. 
By contrast, Du Bartas marvels at the ‘reading’ abilities of the ‘Antarctique brutal’ 
although he acknowledges that they are greatly surpassed by those of the faithful.24 
As Rieu notes, the limitation upon natural knowledge of God which the poet does 
discuss is that some might foolishly choose not to pursue it, like the child at school 
who prefers to look at the decorations in a book than to read it (155–62). In addition, 
Du Bartas changes Calvin’s image of the ‘spectacles of Scripture’ which enable us to 
read the book of nature to ‘spectacles of faith’;25 while faith may imply Scripture, 
nonetheless the poet does not mention Scripture directly as Calvin does.26
However, Du Bartas is also extremely distant from Sabunde’s confident faith in 
reason (although he represents natural theology using commonplaces popularized 
by Sabunde’s writing).27 Du Bartas does not use the cosmos to make specific 
arguments about the nature or essence of God, beyond saying that it manifests his 
power, greatness, love, and so on;28 or, on Day II, suggesting that the interactions 
of the elements manifest the wisdom of God’s choice to separate them out of the 
chaos.29 Furthermore, as we have seen, the poet’s decision to perceive God in the 
cosmos is implicitly opposed to the application of reason to the Trinity. Thus, Du 
Bartas expresses confidence in man’s ability to perceive the cosmos as image of the 
divine, but not in the powers of human reason to derive from these images answers 
to tricky questions concerning the nature of the divine.
In Genesis, it is of course man who is said to be made in the ‘image and 
resemblance’ of God (1.26). However, Luther had maintained emphatically that 
the image of God in man had been ruined by the Fall, even if some tiny relic of it 
might remain. Calvin, on the other hand, while treating the imago dei in complex 
ways, certainly implied more strongly than Luther the continued existence of the 
imago dei,30 asserting that the image of God, while present in creation in general, 
was found especially in man, and particularly in the human soul.31 However, 
while celebrating human capacities fairly extensively, Calvin also stressed quite 
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categorically the obliteration of the image of God in man; Francis M. Higman 
explains that the emphasis upon its destruction is usually in polemical contexts 
where Calvin contends that the qualities of fallen man are entirely useless from 
the point of view of salvation, an argument central, of course, to the theological 
disputes of the Reformation.32 For Calvin, man ought to be aware not only 
of Adam’s similarity to God but also of fallen man’s difference from God.33 
Nonetheless, even when claiming the absolute annihilation of the imago dei, Calvin 
often uses expressions like ‘presques du tout’ [almost entirely] or ‘quelques restes’ 
[some remainder], which imply that the annihilation in question is in fact not quite 
absolute.34 In short, the question of man’s difference from — and imaging of — God 
was a very live one in the sixteenth century, and central in Protestant challenges to 
Catholic thought.
Du Bartas refers brief ly to man as an image of God on Day VII of the Sepmaine, 
when arguing that God does intervene in the cosmos: since man’s humanity stems 
from certain qualities, it follows that God, of whom man is but a ‘mort image’ 
(VII, 109) must also have those qualities of ‘Justice, Soin, Conseil, Amour, Bonté, 
Pouvoir’ (VII, 108). Thus man as image of God — albeit a ‘dead’ image — tells 
us something about God. However, a lengthier insight into Du Bartas’s perception 
of man is provided on Day VI, when Du Bartas considers first the human body 
and then the human soul, in accordance with the order of creation suggested 
by Genesis. He stresses the wonders of the body, and then argues that while the 
soul cannot be perceived directly, it can be apprehended in its effects, namely 
in manifestations of human memory, cognition and creation.35 Similarly, Calvin 
describes the capabilities of the human soul — its ability to ‘ journey’ through the 
secrets of nature, through the heavens and the earth, and to retain many things 
in memory — in order to argue that these capacities clearly exceed those of the 
body. However, Calvin claims to have touched upon them relatively brief ly since, 
for the Christian reader, it is sufficient simply to be aware of them (Institution, 
I.xv.2); man should not be too confident of his powers.36 By contrast, as critics have 
observed, Du Bartas portrays them at great length (VI, 755–932), and describes the 
soul as divine (759, 855, 906). Du Bartas’s discussion echoes in some points that of 
Marsilio Ficino, who highlighted human achievements in order to demonstrate the 
immortality and furthermore the divinity of the human soul.37 Du Bartas evokes 
human creations which are indistinguishable from their counterparts created by 
God, and strongly emphasizes that they reveal man’s similarity to God. In addition, 
within the narrative of God’s creation, he depicts at length man as a creator; within 
a description of the signs of God within his creation, he also discusses the signs of 
the human soul in its creations.38 I quote a short extract from a longer passage:
Ce chatouilleux desir, qui te fait imiter 
Les ouvrages plus beaux du nom-feint Jupiter, 
Porte par ces effects fidelle tesmoignage 
De ton extraction, et que son sainct image 
Fut en tout ame empreint quand son esprit vivant, 
Pour animer ton corps, t’emplit d’un sacré vent, 
Car comme il est tout beau, ton ame est toute belle, 
Comme il est immortel, ton ame est immortelle. 
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Il ne chomme jamais, et ton entendement 
Est tousjours en travail, à l’erte, en mouvement. (VI, 909–18)
[This keen desire, which makes you imitate the most beautiful works of the 
non-feigned Jupiter, bears in these effects faithful witness of your extraction, 
and that his holy image was imprinted in every soul when his living spirit, in 
order to animate your body, filled you with a holy wind, for as he is all beautiful, 
your soul is all beautiful, as he is immortal, your soul is immortal. He is never 
idle, and your understanding is always at work, vigilant, in movement.]
Du Bartas does brief ly mention that man’s divinity has been ‘effaced’,39 and yet 
almost two hundred lines have just described it in the present tense.
God’s ‘breath’ and the human soul
Du Bartas’s discussion of the human soul, like that of Calvin, for example, also 
treats verse 2.7 from Genesis in which God is said to have breathed his spirit into 
man.40 In the Geneva Bible, the verse reads as follows: ‘Or le Seigneur Dieu avoit 
forme l’homme de la pouldre de la terre, et inspire en la face d’iceluy ’spiration de 
vie, et l’homme fut faict en ame vivante’ [God had formed man from the dust of 
the earth, and breathed into his face the aspiration of life, and man was made into a 
living soul]. Similarly, the Vulgate gives ‘formavit igitur Dominus Deus hominem 
de limo terrae et inspiravit in faciem eius spiraculum vitae et factus est homo in 
animam viventem’. In the Geneva translation, a note in the margin pertaining to 
the word ‘’spiration [sic]’ gives alternative translations: ‘Ou, souff le, halaine. C. 
esprit vital’.41
Calvin, like Augustine in his Two Books On Genesis Against the Manichees II.8 
(pp. 104–07), discusses Genesis 2.7 in detail in order to argue that we must not 
interpret it as meaning that a part of the nature of God was turned into the soul 
of man. Calvin emphasizes that the verse does not imply that a portion of divinity 
f lowed into man to form his soul; the soul is not of the essence of God like a shoot 
is from a plant, or a branch cut off a tree; creation is not a transfusion of God’s 
divinity; humankind is God’s lineage in quality rather than in substance. Otherwise 
God would be subject to change and to passions and all the vices of the human soul. 
Augustine — the most important patristic writer, of course, for many Reformation 
thinkers — expresses a similar concern that if the nature of God were turned into 
the soul of man then God would be subject to sin and imperfection; in addition, he 
observes that it would suggest that God were contained by place.
Du Bartas treats rather differently from Augustine and Calvin the issue of God’s 
non-separation. He does state repeatedly that God neither divided himself nor 
shared his essence with his creation (715–16); God lost nothing (717), and man 
received only qualities from God but took none of his substance (‘rien de [...]’, 
729), not ‘la moindre portion’ (723) [the least portion]. However, alongside these 
echoes of Augustine and Calvin, the poet also claims that man receives ‘quelque 
petit’ [some small] stream of divinity, and ‘quelque’ [some] glow of celestial light. 
The expressions ‘quelque petit’ and ‘quelque’ rather contrast with the emphatic 
‘rien’ and not ‘la moindre portion’.42 This apparent contradiction is rather like that 
which Higman describes in Calvin’s writing about the imago dei but it is accentuated 
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and, crucially, does not describe the persistence of the image of God in fallen man 
but rather the delicate question of God’s ‘breathing’ upon man. Du Bartas asserts 
that God does not divide his divinity, yet also that man is given ‘some small’ stream 
of it:
Or ce docte Imager pour son œuvre animer, 
Ne prit de l’air, du feu, de terre, de la mer, 
Une cinquiesme essence, ains poussant son haleine 
Il fit comme couler de la vive fontaine 
De sa divinité quelque petit ruisseau 
Dans les sacrez conduits de ce fresle vaisseau. 
Non qu’il se demembrast, non qu’il fist un partage 
De sa triple-une essence avec son propre ouvrage, 
Ains, sans perdre le sien, d’un souf le il le rendit 
Riche de ses vertus, et puissant respandit 
Si bien ses rais sur luy qu’encor mesme il luy reste 
Quelque lustre apparent de la clarté celeste. (VI, 709–20)
[Now this learned Image-maker to animate his work, did not take from air, 
from fire, from earth, from the sea, a fifth essence, rather emitting his breath 
he made ‘as if ’ f lowing some small stream from the live fountain of his divinity 
into the sacred conduits of this frail vessel. Not that he dismembered himself, 
not that he shared his triple-unitary essence with his own work, rather, 
without losing his own, with a breath he rendered it rich with his virtues, and 
powerfully spread so well his rays on him that there even now remains in him 
some manifest glow of celestial brightness.]
Whereas Calvin and Augustine emphasized the non-separation of God, Du Bartas 
is rather more enigmatic, evoking ‘some small’ transfer of divinity and then, 
conversely, denying this (‘Non qu’il [...]’).
Similarly, a few lines later, Du Bartas states of God’s breath that ‘ce n’estoit qu’un 
vent’:
Bref, ce n’estoit qu’un vent: or le vent, bien qu’il sorte 
Du creux de l’estomach, toutesfois il n’emporte 
Rien de nostre substance, ains seulement retient 
Les pures qualitez de la part dont il vient. (727–30).
[In short, it was nothing but a wind: now wind, although it leaves the hollow 
of the stomach, nonetheless it takes nothing of our substance, but only retains 
the pure qualities of the part from which it comes]
The reference to wind ostensibly demonstrates that God shared with man not 
substance but only qualities yet, nonetheless, ‘ne [...] que [...]’, like ‘quelque petit’, 
once again implies that God did give something to man, albeit something that was 
only ‘wind’. Thus apparently categorical statements about the ‘nothing’ conveyed to 
man from God’s substance are coupled with references to something which none-
theless was transferred.
Our understanding of that which was passed on to man depends upon how 
we interpret Du Bartas’s ‘stream’, ‘glow’ and ‘wind’. The poet’s discussion differs 
from that of Calvin and Augustine in referring to what God gave man not only 
in abstract terms of substance and quality but also through images. For example, 
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whereas Calvin stated that divinity did not f low into man as if in a transfusion, Du 
Bartas creates an image precisely of this, perhaps inspired by Psalm 36, as Goulart 
suggests,43 or by Lactantius:44 God ‘fit comme couler de la vive fontaine / De sa 
divinité quelque petit ruisseau’ (712–13). Although the poet immediately proceeds 
to state that this did not imply dividing God’s essence, he nonetheless suggests that 
the image of pouring has some role to play in our understanding what God did 
when he ‘breathed’ in Genesis 2.7.
Since both man and the divine are represented as water, a sense of similarity is 
created between them. If God’s divinity is a ‘ fontaine’ then man receives ‘quelque 
petit ruisseau’ (712–13): thus, whereas Lactantius suggests that man’s soul comes from 
God’s spirit, and uses the image of the fountain, Du Bartas adds the ‘ruisseau’ to 
further emphasize a similarity between the soul and its divine source. The image 
of the fontaine and ruisseaux was used by Calvin to represent the Trinity,45 whose 
persons are ‘non divers en essence’ (I, 72), as Du Bartas observed before reproaching 
himself for his temerity in addressing such a subject; the application of the image to 
the divine and man, with whom God did not share his ‘essence’ (II, 715–16), is more 
surprising in the degree of identity implied between the two.
Similarly, where God has ‘rais’, man receives ‘quelque lustre apparent de la clarté 
celeste’ (718–20). Like those of water, images of light are used for both the human 
and the divine.46 Du Bartas does not seem as concerned as Augustine and Calvin 
to stress man’s difference from God, since he does not mention man’s sin, but, 
furthermore, rather than simply neglecting the question of difference, the poet uses 
images which point to similarity between the human and the divine: linguistic 
images accentuate the degree to which man is an ontological image of God. The 
poet began his discussion by referring to man as an ‘image vantee’ (708) and to 
God as an ‘Imager’ (709), thus emphasizing that God created man as an image of 
himself; the cosmic images used for both the human and the divine underscore 
a closeness between man and that which he ontologically images, namely God. 
Cosmic images are used to imply similarities between the human and the divine 
(as well as, perhaps, between the cosmic and the divine).
The conception of God’s ‘spirit’ or ‘breath’ as ‘wind’ stems from the Old 
Testament, in which the Hebrew word rûach carries these diverse meanings. God’s 
spirit was designated with other Hebrew words too, such as neshâmâh, used in 
Genesis 2.7 to describe the ‘breath’ which animated man; however, in some passages 
the two words are used in parallel (including in contexts which designate God as 
he who gives life, the sense with which we are concerned in Genesis 2.7).47 Thus 
Biblical references to God’s spiritus could evoke the image of wind. Furthermore, 
the challenge posed to translators by the polysemy of rûach was well-known. For 
example, with reference to Genesis 1.2, Luther observed that rûach can mean either 
spiritus or ventus, and translated it differently at different times; Calvin, for his 
part, was absolutely clear that spiritus was the best translation, and explained this 
preference in his commentary on Genesis.48 Du Bartas’s more specific image of 
the wind which leaves the stomach is, as Reichenberger observes,49 familiar from 
Augustine’s De anima. However, it is important to note that Augustine evokes this 
comparison in order to discredit it: he dwells at length upon its unsuitability and 
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upon the errors into which it leads the Christian, namely the belief that God made 
the soul out of himself. By contrast, Du Bartas employs the comparison precisely to 
make an argument about the nature of the divine.
As Augustine suggested, the very use of an image from the human realm suggests 
similarities between God and man. However, Du Bartas insists that the image is 
necessary: ‘ce n’estoit qu’un vent’. The ‘breath’ in Genesis 2.7 was ‘nothing but a 
wind’, or ‘nothing other than a wind’. This seems to indicate that ‘wind’ is in some 
sense a proper description of the breath. The assertion that ‘it was nothing other 
than a wind’ implies once again that there was something, and, furthermore, that it 
should be termed vent. If that which was given to man can only be termed vent, then 
this image is indispensable. The frequency of images throughout the passage has 
similar implications: images are of central importance in exploring the mystery of 
God’s ‘breath’. In addition to the images of light, water, and wind, Du Bartas also 
evokes other comparisons with which Calvin disagreed in the Institution, namely 
those with the bud which is born from a shoot, and with human lineage (rather 
than lineage of ‘qualities’ alone).
Ontological images and linguistic images
Du Bartas uses precisely the images which Calvin and Augustine mistrusted, and 
exploits the implications of these images which the theologians argued against. 
Furthermore, quite apart from these particular images, the poet’s imagistic style 
differs greatly from the clear argumentative styles of Calvin and Augustine. Images 
are not surprising in poetry in general or in Du Bartas’s in particular; however, 
here the poet chooses to employ them in what is essentially Biblical commentary. 
While cosmic images for the divine are widely used in the Bible,50 the legitimacy of 
conceiving the divine through analogy with the natural had become an increasingly 
controversial question, described by Higman as ‘one of the great philosophical 
conf licts of the sixteenth century, one which goes beyond the division between 
Catholic and Reformed, and is prolonged in the thought of Montaigne: the conf lict 
between Aquinas and Augustine in theological thought’, that is, between the 
divergent opinions according to which, in one case, it is legitimate to know the 
spiritual through analogy with the sensible, and, in the other, it is in and through 
the soul that one knows God.51 This controversy had implications for the use of 
linguistic images.
As I have discussed, Protestant theologians, including Calvin, tended to suggest 
that ontological images of God (human or cosmic phenomena which image the 
divine) could lead postlapsarian man to false notions of the divine. Attempts to infer 
something about the divine from the human or cosmic would produce a notion of 
the divine sullied by the human or the cosmic, just as deducing something about 
God’s breath from the human or cosmic realms would imply God’s imperfection. 
Although the only knowledge of God possible is analogical, we must use analogies in a 
way that makes it clear that they are to be seen as nothing in comparison with God.
These views of analogy and difference are crucial to fundamental Calvinist 
challenges to Catholic doctrine. For Calvin, the Catholic doctrine of transub stan-
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tiation is based on a misunderstanding of analogy, which is supposed to lead us from 
the visible to the invisible; transubstantiation is a human ‘imagination’.52 It amounts 
to contaminating or polluting God with the impurity of man and of the elements.53 
In their celebration of the Eucharist, French Protestants were repeatedly reminded 
that divine power was not to be confused with visible ‘earthly and corruptible 
elements’.54 Similarly, Catholic veneration of Mary — veneration which seemed to 
some more like adoration, blurring the theological distinction between the two — 
is based on assigning to the human attributes that properly belong to the divine.55
As is well known, these concerns about the proper separation of the divine and 
the non-divine rendered problematic the use of visual images. They constitute the 
theological explanation (as distinct from social explanations) for the iconoclasm 
which began in the 1520s and continued with vehemence into the 1570s. Most of 
the Protestant groups, with the exception of Lutherans and Moravians, were uneasy, 
and frequently antagonistic, to the visual arts in church.56 According to David 
Freedberg, all sixteenth-century interdictions concerning visual art ultimately 
concerned the distinction between the everyday and the sacred.57 Visual images 
tended to be treated as if they were relics, worthy of adoration rather than simply 
veneration, and the Council of Trent decree of 1563 responded to criticism of images 
by claiming that one venerated them not because any divinity was believed to 
inhere in them but rather because the honour paid to them passed on to the subjects 
they represented.58 In other words, debates raged about whether it was legitimate to 
approach the divine through visual images, and what it meant to do so.
The concern about distinguishing between the divine and the non-divine had 
implications for linguistic images as well as visual ones. For Calvin, comparisons 
risked disguising the true nature of God by implying too great a similarity 
between the invisible world of the divine and the visible world of the cosmos: 
they are aligned with ‘imaginations’ and ‘inventions’ used pejoratively.59 In his 
commentaries, according to Olivier Millet, Calvin is sensitive to the use of images. 
He often describes them as aptum, thus interpreting them as ‘appropriate’ and as 
playing a necessary didactic role. Calvin is obviously uncomfortable about the 
incongruity of some Biblical images, and warns his reader against the danger of 
interpreting the subject matter too much in terms of that to which it is compared. 
He has a tendency to consider every detail of an image as corresponding to a detail 
of the argument, and is clearly uneasy if it does not.60
This affected Calvin’s own use of language. Calvin employs images which are 
either taken from the Bible or similar to Biblical images, thus presumably warding 
off the danger of creating comparisons without the guide of Scripture. Moreover, 
Calvin often converts Biblical metaphors into similes, so that the divine and the 
cosmic are presented as similar rather than being identified: ‘what was poetic and 
representative in the Bible becomes intellectual and illustrative with Calvin.’61 
Furthermore, passages explaining doctrine usually contain only the occasional, 
isolated image.62 Such images are always subordinated to the theological argument 
in question and are not elaborated for the purposes of ornamentation. Thus, images 
are formulated as similitudes which clearly illustrate a particular point in the 
argument. More generally, Calvin clearly delineates the meanings of words.63
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Calvin’s use of simile rather than metaphor differs not only from the medieval 
tradition but also from Luther, who believes, for example, that ‘ein’ feste Burg ist 
unser Gott’ [a mighty fortress is our God], and who, of course, upheld the doctrine 
of the Real Presence.64 However, Calvin’s abstract and analytical style was widely 
admired. The Protestant Pierre Viret, while using many similes, did so in a way 
which aimed at clarity of comprehension, and Higman suggests that this is ‘not 
unrepresentative’ of the Genevan Reformers. Moreover, in the second half of the 
sixteenth century, Catholic writers responded to the Protestant challenge not only 
by publishing works of expository theology and Biblical commentary in French but 
also by doing so in a style inspired by that of Calvin, which differed greatly from 
that of pre-Reformation devotional texts with their frequent use of images. Thus, 
Higman suggests, Calvin inf luenced the theological writing not only of other 
Calvinist or Reformed thinkers but also of Catholics.65 Finally, Melanchthon’s new 
rhetorical genre intended for university teachers but particularly for preachers, the 
‘genre didascalique’, similarly advised using figures only with care and never where 
a proper term would suffice; the goal here, as for Calvin, was clarity.66
In its use of images in particular, Du Bartas’s treatment of Genesis 2.7 is 
stylistically very different from this ideal of writing epitomized above all by Calvin. 
Rather than occasional images, the discussion of God’s breath employs a series of 
different ones. The poet has clearly stated that God used his own breath rather than 
the four elements to animate man but he obviously believes that the breath can be 
imaged in the elemental.67 Furthermore, while Du Bartas’s comparisons may appear 
to be intended to illustrate a more abstract statement (that God did not divide his 
tripartite essence), they do not so much illustrate it as make a different portion of 
the argument (‘ains [...]’); moreover, as we have seen, they do not really disprove the 
notion of God’s ‘separation’ but rather imply that God did indeed share something 
with man.68 As I have explained, Du Bartas tends to employ images whenever 
describing something not perceptible by the senses; this applies to his treatment of 
the divine as well as the cosmic. The Protestant poet is able to use images in a way 
that the Protestant theologian does not.
We have already seen that Du Bartas chooses to consider the ontological image 
of the cosmos rather than to reason about God’s Trinitarian nature; in addition, he 
does so by using linguistic images. As I explained in my Introduction, the parallel 
between ontological images and linguistic ones could justify human imagination or 
poetic imagination more specifically. Certainly Du Bartas’s Catholic commentator 
Thévenin writes as if poetic images could be equated with ontological ones: he 
describes Du Bartas’s comparison of God’s breath to the vent which leaves the human 
stomach as a ‘similitude pour eslever les plus grossiers en consideration de l’origine de 
l’ame’ (p. 610) [a similitude to elevate the most obtuse into consideration of the 
origin of the soul]. This recalls natural-theological descriptions of the power of the 
cosmos to teach even the uneducated about God:69 here instruction does not derive 
from the ontological image of the cosmos itself but rather from a poetic image, as 
if poetic images were a way of apprehending God. Du Bartas’s relatively positive 
view concerning natural knowledge of God may stem from an approach to God 
through the cosmos which is indebted less to reason than to the imagination (in the 
sixteenth-century sense of the term, that is, the use of images).
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In the rest of this chapter, I shall examine more closely the ways in which Du 
Bartas uses images in representations of the divine. I shall show that he associates 
a shifting nexus of divine, human and cosmic meanings in a way which very 
much goes against Calvin’s concern to clearly delineate the meaning of words; in 
addition, the same image may shift between identifying two terms and comparing 
them, thereby, I shall suggest, pointing to questions about the degree and status 
of similarity between them. Thus Du Bartas’s images do not simply illustrate a 
meaning which can be clearly expressed in proper terms, but signify differently 
from proper terms. Furthermore, Du Bartas’s imagistic language can be difficult to 
make sense of, and calls attention to itself, thereby encouraging the reader to think 
not only about the divine but also about ‘image-thinking’ about the divine. While 
some writers cautioned that images should simply be shunned, in order to avoid 
implying a similarity between the divine and the non-divine, Du Bartas chooses to 
use images in complex ways which, I shall argue, serve to explore the relationship 
between the divine and the non-divine, as well as the ways in which images can be 
employed to think about this relationship.
Poetic Images of the divine
Rewriting the ‘De rerum natura’: cosmic images in a Christian universe
After narrating the creation of the soul, Du Bartas argues that it can be perceived 
in its effects just as the wind can be perceived in its effects upon the landscape, and 
unseen scents in their effects upon our nostrils, and unseen sounds in their effects 
upon us (VI, 732–88, especially 743–60). As Stéphane Lamacz has observed, this 
passage is imitated from Lucretius’s De rerum natura:70 Lucretius similarly uses the 
examples of the wind and scents to argue that we can gain knowledge of something 
invisible but, in Lucretius’s case, the invisible constitutes atoms rather than the soul. 
Lucretius became popular in the sixteenth century in particular through Denys 
Lambin’s 1563 edition and commentary. Furthermore, Simone Fraisse claims that 
Du Bartas had read the De rerum natura more closely than any other writer of his 
period except Montaigne,71 and suggests that, with the exception of Montaigne, 
Lucretius’s appeal was greatest to poets.72
Du Bartas’s interest in the De rerum natura is predictable, since the Sepmaine 
resembles it both in cosmic subject matter and in length. However, the world-
views of the two poems differ enormously, and it might seem especially startling 
that Du Bartas imitates Lucretius’s images in a discussion of the soul, which has 
implications for the relationship between the divine and the human. Where the soul 
is concerned, one might have expected Du Bartas’s images to be adapted solely from 
Scripture or from Christian theology. However, I will suggest that Du Bartas’s way 
of employing Lucretius’s images inscribes his difference from Lucretius — that is, 
inscribes his Christian world-view — and also ref lects upon what that world-view 
implies for the use of images.
Lamacz, who focuses upon sensory perception in the Sepmaine, claims that Du 
Bartas retains the ‘positions sensualistes’ of the De rerum natura but abandons its 
logical argument, replacing reason with faith, and the Epicurean with a Christian 
48     Poetry and Theology
empiricist. Of course, Lucretius did aim to undermine religious faith, maintaining 
that the soul was composed of atoms and would disintegrate with the body. 
However, Du Bartas does not replace reason with faith. Whereas, in the twenty-
first century, belief in an immortal soul bestowed by God is usually considered to 
require faith, in the sixteenth century the existence of this soul — like that of God 
— was often thought self-evident, and demonstrable by reason without revelation.73 
Moreover, rather than simply describing sensory perceptions, Du Bartas, like 
Lucretius, constructs an argument based on a comparison, suggesting that if one 
invisible object can be perceived in its effects, then so can another. Therefore, 
within the context of sixteenth-century Christian belief, we cannot classify Du 
Bartas’s argument as devoid of reason. Instead, rather like the Protestant apologists 
of the final quarter of the century, Du Bartas engages with non-Christian views by 
arguing about the divine from nature.74
The fundamental difference between Lucretius and Du Bartas concerns the 
types of invisible entity which they judge to exist, and which they believe can 
be compared with visible phenomena. Lucretius apprehends the sensory effects of 
invisible physical objects, and compares two physical processes (the effects of atoms 
and the effects of winds). By contrast, Du Bartas perceives the sensory effects of 
a divine phenomenon (the soul’s ‘divin pouvoir’ [divine power]), and compares a 
physical process (the effects of winds) with a divine one (the effects of the soul). Thus 
Du Bartas rewrites a Lucretian comparison, demonstrating that it can be marshalled 
to attest not to an atomistic universe with no loving God but, conversely, to a 
universe in which the marvellous effects of a human soul bear witness to its divine 
provenance: the poet’s use of this comparison contributes to a reformulation of the 
De rerum natura into a Christian epic.
Lucretius supposes that natural phenomena can only be compared with other 
natural phenomena, whereas, as the Sepmaine shows, from a Christian standpoint 
like Du Bartas’s, nature also images the divine. Indeed, if we replace Du Bartas’s 
Lucretian imitation in its context in the Sepmaine, we can clearly perceive a 
suggestion by the poet that Lucretius’s images are better suited to a Christian 
argument than to an Epicurean one. The passage closely follows Du Bartas’s 
assertion that ‘ce n’estoit qu’un vent’, and is introduced by the statement that ‘ce 
vent je veux descrire’ [I want to describe this wind]. Thus, at the point when the 
vent appears as a comparison for the soul, it has already been used as a name for it, 
including in the line which initiates the discussion. Furthermore, when the poet 
first refers to the meteorological wind (743), it is not clarified for another twelve 
lines that he intends to compare it with the soul, although the reader might guess 
this; therefore, when the poet alludes to the (meteorological) vent, the reader is all 
the more likely — in his efforts to make sense of the passage — to connect it to 
the vent[s] which have previously been mentioned, namely the divine breath or the 
human soul.
Therefore the context in which Du Bartas imitates Lucretius implies that the 
wind may be similar to the soul in a much more real sense than it is to underlying 
cosmic forces. Lucretius’s image of the wind appears arbitrary by comparison with 
Du Bartas’s. Du Bartas suggests that using images can be more complex than the 
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recognition of two realities which are similar but separate: in the case of vent, divine 
and cosmic realities can be represented by the same word, as if their similarity were 
closer to identification than to resemblance. In Du Bartas’s depiction of the soul, 
images associated with wind have a singular significance; it is for this reason that, 
by contrast with Charles Toutain, who also imitates this passage from Lucretius (and 
who specifies that ‘l’Ame [...] n’a rien [...] de vent’, f. 35r [the Soul contains nothing 
of wind]), Du Bartas did not utilize other comparisons (such as noise, growth, heat, 
and cold) from the long list in the relevant passage in the De rerum natura.75 The 
wind has a special status as image of the soul and of the divine, and is particularly 
well-suited for representing them.
The status(es) of images
When Du Bartas affirms of God’s ‘breath’ that ‘ce n’estoit qu’un vent’, he asserts 
the centrality of this image but perhaps thereby undermines the importance of 
his earlier ones, calling into question the value of the images of light and water. 
Whereas the poet had said that man received ‘some small stream’ and ‘some glow’ 
of celestial light, now he declares that God gave ‘nothing but wind’. Not only is 
the transfer of divinity suggested by ‘quelque petit ruisseau’ denied (‘non qu’il fist 
un partage [...]’) but, in addition, the image is rendered problematic by another one 
which claims to be the only possible representation of God’s breath. The imaging of 
the divine as water and light thus seems to be provisional and open to question.76
The images of lineage and the bud, which Calvin considered f lawed, also seem 
to be both employed and denied in the Sepmaine. Du Bartas states that man did 
not take the least portion of God’s substance, like the son receives his essence from 
that of his father, or like the bud / vine is born from the shoot / branch. The 
syntax in the poem, as in my paraphrase, is ambiguous: syntactically speaking, it 
is unclear whether the poet means that God’s creation of man was like or unlike 
the birth of the son or of the bud. Given that the poet has already stated apparently 
quite unambiguously that God did not share his essence (715–16), we are invited 
to interpret these lines as differentiating between the creation of man, on the one 
hand, and that of sons and buds on the other. However, the syntax renders this 
reading difficult, although not impossible. If the point were to deny the value of 
these comparisons, as Calvin does, it would be odd to employ such ambivalent 
syntax. In his syntax, as in his images, Du Bartas’s linguistic practice is diametrically 
opposed to that manifested most extremely by Calvin. Arguably Du Bartas here 
exploits the f luid syntax which his poetic style permits him. By not unambiguously 
refuting the comparisons, the poet seems to leave open at least the possibility that 
they have some value, and to question what role they might play:
Ainsi l’esprit d’Adam proceda de l’Esprit, 
Pere de l’univers, sans toutesfois qu’il prist 
La moindre portion de sa simple substance, 
Comme le fils reçoit essence de l’essence 
De son pere mortel, ou comme au renouveau 
De l’humide sarment naist un bourgeon nouveau. (721–26)
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[Thus the spirit of Adam proceeded from the Spirit of the Father of the 
universe, without however it taking the least portion of his simple substance, 
like the son receives essence from the essence of his mortal father, or like in 
spring from the moist branch / twig is born a new vine / bud.]
Thus, Du Bartas both employs the images yet also preserves the possibility of 
denying them. In a very general sense, his practice has something in common with 
negative theology, insofar as it uses images but also negates them; however, the 
negation of his images is very different, and remains uncertain. Du Bartas’s images 
for the divine seem, to varying degrees, to be tentative, so that the similarities 
which they imply between the human and the divine are likewise speculative and 
provisional.
The nature of similarity entailed by images is also affected by their construction. 
The images of fatherhood and a plant are, structurally speaking, comparisons 
(‘comme [...] ou comme’), whereas vocabulary of light, water, and wind is used 
as if it were proper for the divine and the human. One might term the latter 
‘metaphor’ but this would tend to imply that the similarity involved was obviously 
a figurative and conceptual one, whereas the problem (from Calvin’s point of view) 
was precisely that the similarity between, say, God and light could be understood 
to be more than figurative, and Du Bartas seems to play with the notion that such 
terms could actually be ‘proper’ in relation to the divine (rather than understood to 
be used as if they were proper terms, that is, metaphorically). With vent in particular, 
the poet seems to suggest that the term is a synonym more than a metaphor: the 
statement that ‘ce n’estoit qu’un vent’ insists on the identification of God’s breath 
and wind. Thus it is more helpful here to speak of a combination of comparisons 
and identifications, rather than of comparisons and metaphors. The poet explores 
the potential ‘propriety’ of particular images and, by extension, the nature of 
similarities between various cosmic, human and divine terms.
Furthermore, the same image can be constructed in different ways, pointing up 
questions about its status. As we have seen, wind is identified with the human soul 
but later appears as a cosmic phenomenon which serves as a comparison for the soul. 
The poet shifts between indicating, on the one hand, that the soul can be identified 
with vent and, on the other, that it can be compared with a vent. Particularly given 
the imitation of Lucretius — and the wider context of the passage, which I shall 
shortly discuss — this invites the reader to ref lect upon the status, or propriety, of 
the image of the wind to represent the divine, to wonder whether wind really is just 
a comparison from another realm of reality. Thus, my point is not simply that Du 
Bartas perhaps prefers the image of the soul or divinity as wind over those of them 
as light and water but rather that, in the case of wind as of those other images, the 
poet highlights questions about the implications of the image.
The movement between identification and comparison has been recognized as an 
important feature of both ‘baroque’ lyric poetry and also Du Bartas’s poetry but is 
usually described as a shift between metaphor and comparison.77 However, at least in 
relation to Du Bartas’s concern with similarities and differences between man and 
God, this description may be misleading: the identification of vent and divine breath 
may imply a real closeness between them, whereas metaphor would conjure in most 
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minds a figurative and conceptual relationship rather than a potentially ontological 
or real one. In the Sepmaine, the genre-specific stylistic practice of shifting between 
the identification and comparison of terms serves as a tool for ref lecting upon 
questions of similarity and difference in the relationship between the divine, 
the human, and the cosmic. Indeed, as we shall see, Du Bartas accentuates this 
movement between identification and comparison so that vent acquires a range of 
relations of similarity and difference with cosmic, human, and divine ‘souf le’ or 
‘esprit’ or ‘haleine’.
Word-play and similarities
We have seen that the use of the same images of water and light for both the human 
soul and the divine point to a similarity between these two. However, the image of 
the fountain also interrogates the similarity of these to the more physical aspects of 
man, thus posing questions about the image of God even in man’s body. Less than 
twenty lines before the ‘fontaine’ and the ‘ruisseau’ refer to God’s divinity and that 
which he bestows upon man in Genesis 2.7, the same image figures a non-divine 
facet of man, namely the dispersion of blood around the body by the liver:
Le foye en [du ‘chile nourricier’] fait du sang, puis le jettant dehors, 
Le despart justement aux membres de ce corps 
Par les conduits rameux d’une plus grande veine, 
Semblable, ou peu s’en faut, à la vive fontaine, 
Qui divisant son cours en cent petits ruisseaux 
Humecte un beau jardin de ses esparses eaux. (VI, 681–86)
[The liver makes blood from it [chyle], then casting it without, distributes it 
equally to the parts of the body via the branchlike conduits of a larger vein, 
like, or almost, the lively fountain, which dividing its course into a hundred little 
streams waters a beautiful garden with its scattered waters.]
As I have mentioned, there is some precedent for the image in discussions of God; 
nor is it unheard of in the bodily context.78 However, given the closeness of the two 
passages in the Sepmaine, their similarity is rather striking: in both instances ‘vive 
fontaine’ and ‘petit[s] ruisseau[x]’ are at the end of two consecutive lines. Du Bartas 
employs the same cosmic image for a divine phenomenon and for a more strictly 
human one, and — since one usage closely follows the other — the reader is likely 
to recall the first when reading the second.
Thus the reuse of an image with very different meanings threatens to jolt the 
reader out of simply ‘reading over’ a relatively commonplace form of representation. 
The expressions which introduce the comparisons also invite ref lection, since they 
are diverse, and suggest that the status of similarity can vary among a complex array 
of possibilities. For example, the ‘vive fontaine’ seems to be a proper term for God’s 
breath (at least at this point in the poem, before ‘ce n’estoit qu’un vent’) but pouring 
is a comparison (‘comme’), and therefore is presented as if it might be an approximate 
similarity. On the other hand, the liver’s likeness to a fountain is perhaps tempered 
by the expression with which it is introduced: ‘semblable, ou peu s’en faut’ (684). 
Thus linguistic images highlight potential similarities between the divine and the 
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physical, pointing to the human and the elemental as ontological images of the 
divine; at the same time, the repeated variation of images — together with various 
formulae of similarity — explore the nature of this possible resemblance between 
divine fontaine and human fontaine.
The word-play becomes much more striking when Du Bartas introduces the 
image of the wind which arguably interests him more than the other images with 
which he experiments. As we have seen, it is brought into the discussion rather 
emphatically as the correct term for God’s breath. It may have seemed more proper 
to Du Bartas than other ones since, as I have mentioned, it was well known that the 
Hebrew of the Old Testament associated ‘wind’, ‘spirit’, and ‘breath’. Furthermore, 
in the sixteenth century, vent could be used to refer to breath more easily than it 
can be in modern French: Cotgrave translates it not only as wind but also as ‘a 
vent, smell, s[c]ent, aire, breath, vapor’,79 and Huguet provides among its meanings 
‘souff le, haleine’ and ‘soupir’.80 Conversely, Cotgrave includes ‘wind’ (and various 
synonyms) among the possible translations of both ‘souff le’ and ‘haleine’.81 Thus 
‘haleine’ (711) and ‘souf le’ (717) become, by extension, ‘vent’. However, while this 
might make vent seem like a proper term for God’s breath, it also demonstrates that 
vent could have both cosmic and human meanings. Du Bartas makes use of this 
poly valency, and also further accentuates it: by serving as apparent synonym for 
God’s breath, vent immediately acquires a divine meaning, and it is subsequently 
invested with a range of meanings from soul to physical breath to wind. Like 
fontaine but to a much greater degree, vent appears repeatedly, with different divine, 
human, and cosmic connotations.
The nexus of words around breath and wind was also connected to esprit, which 
had a variety of possible meanings including ‘soul’, ‘breath’, ‘mind’, ‘life’ and 
‘wind’. Cotgrave’s lengthy entry for the term begins as follows: ‘The Spirit, Soule; 
Heart; breath, heat; mind, thought; opinion; wit, conceit; also, life, courage, metall, 
stomacke, vivacitie, livelinesse, or smartnesse of humor’; Huguet gives as meanings 
of esprit ‘souff le’ and ‘élément subtil, principe de vie et de pensée’;82 finally, Du 
Bartas also describes winds as esprits.83 In the passage glossing Genesis 2.7, esprit 
refers to Adam’s esprit and then God’s, and the similarity in vocabulary implies a 
similarity of the entities designated. The contrasting uses of esprit draw attention to 
themselves since both are within the same line: ‘Ainsi l’esprit d’Adam proceda de 
l’Esprit, / Pere de l’univers’ (721–22). This poses, indirectly yet clearly, the question 
of the relationship between man’s soul and God’s Spirit. Du Bartas similarly plays 
upon human and divine meanings of esprit elsewhere in the Sepmaine, including in 
evocations of the creative powers of both esprits.84 This contrasts with Calvin’s care 
in his commentary on Isaiah 40.13 to present the similitude between man’s esprit 
and God’s esprit as a divine invention with heuristic rather than ontological weight, 
thus clarifying that man’s spirit is not the essential spirit of God (f. 245r). Du Bartas’s 
liking for this word-play upon human and divine meanings explains why he does 
not use the word ame more frequently in his ensuing discussion of the soul’s powers 
but prefers the polysemic word esprit.85
After using esprit with both human and divine senses (721), Du Bartas proceeds 
to a similar but more striking practice with the related word vent. After stating that 
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‘ce n’estoit qu’un vent’ (727), the poet repeats vent three times in the following five 
lines. The first use of the term on line 727 apparently denotes divine ‘breath’ and 
the second human breath — breath that leaves the stomach. The second vent is a 
physical emission of air, connoting — in Aristotelian terms — the organic soul 
rather than the rational soul: in other words, it denotes the ‘breath’ which endows 
man with life but not that which enables him to think and to create. By contrast, 
four lines later, the same term, vent, will be used to introduce the discussion 
(imitating Lucretius) of man’s intellectual powers, that is, of the rational soul rather 
than the organic one:
Bref, ce n’estoit qu’un vent: or le vent, bien qu’il sorte 
Du creux de l’estomach, toutefois il n’emporte 
Rien de nostre substance, ains seulement retient 
Les pures qualitez de la part dont il vient. 
Inspiré par ce vent, ce vent je veux descrire: 
Celuy n’a point d’esprit qui son esprit n’admire, 
Celuy n’a point de sens qui nuict et jour ne sent 
Les effects merveilleux d’un souf le si puissant. (727–34)
[In short, it was nothing but a wind: now wind, although it leaves the hollow of 
the stomach, nonetheless it takes nothing of our substance, but only retains the 
pure qualities of the part from which it comes. Inspired by this wind, this wind I 
want to describe: he has no spirit who does not admire his spirit, he has no senses 
who night and day does not sense the marvellous effects of such a powerful 
breath / wind (souf le).]
The question of the nature of the soul bestowed in Genesis 2.7 was a theologically 
difficult one: Augustine initially thought man was created animal in 2.7 but later 
changed his mind and decided that in 2.7 he was already given the rational soul 
which defined his specificity and his closeness to God.86 Du Bartas does not address 
the tricky question of whether man was given only life or also the rational soul but 
instead uses the same word — vent — to refer to both possibilities. Furthermore, Du 
Bartas’s language is of course even more slippery than the confusion of organic and 
rational souls suggests, since in both 727 and 731 vent also refers to divine ‘breath’. 
The first use of vent in line 731 logically refers to divine breath: this corresponds to 
a more general practice by some Christian poets of replacing the inspiration of the 
Muses with that of the Holy Spirit (the notion of inspiration in this conception is of 
course still closely linked to breath). Therefore, in line 731, vent has both human and 
divine meanings. Thus in lines 727–31 vent means purely physical human vent (that 
which leaves the stomach), as well as the human vent which is the soul and perhaps 
like the divine, and also the divine vent of God.
The particularly prominent word-play in this section is further complicated 
by similar uses of other words belonging to the halaine / vent / esprit nexus. The 
word esprit returns in 732 to refer to the human soul, and in its repetition within 
the line echoes the play on vent in the previous line, 731. In addition, the ‘effects 
merveilleux d’un soufle si puissant’ (734) evoke the effects of God’s ‘souf le’ (717) 
discussed throughout the previous passage — that is, the human soul which is an 
effect of God the cause — but of course the poet has now progressed to talking 
about the effects of the human soul, that is, human creations: it is thus as if man’s 
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creative powers simply repeated the divine powers which created him, as if his 
creative power was exactly analogous to God’s which, like his, can be perceived in 
its effects.87
The notion of scent is also connected to this nexus of meanings: one of the senses 
Huguet gives for ‘haleine’ is ‘odorat’ and he quotes Ambroise Paré as stating that 
‘l’odeur [...] est une qualité en nostre haleine’;88 as we have seen above, Cotgrave 
included ‘smell, s[c]ent’ and so on among the possible meanings of ‘vent’. Scents were 
another comparison used by Lucretius for atoms but, like wind, scents have a closer 
relationship to breath, the subject of Du Bartas’s discussion. Where Lucretius simply 
referred to abstract ‘odores’, Du Bartas uses the word ‘souspirs’ [sighs / breaths] to 
refer to the rose’s scent, so that the scent is transformed anthropomorphically into 
an emission of breath, like the soul or spirit itself. In the following line, the wind 
itself emits ‘souspirs’, so that it is brought closer still to the scent of the rose:
L’odorante vapeur que la rose souspire, 
Tandis que les souspirs d’un amoureux Zephyre 
Esmaillent la campagne, [...] (VI, 747–49)
[The scenting vapour which the rose sighs / breathes, while the sighs / breaths 
of an amorous Zephyrus decorate the countryside, ...]
The use of ‘souspir’ with reference both to scents and to the wind does not have 
to be painstakingly sought by the literary critic: as elsewhere, Du Bartas employs 
the same word more than once within the space of two lines, thus pointing up a 
similarity between the two entities which it describes. The ‘thinking’ done through 
images seems to have been quite intentional on Du Bartas’s part. Where the same 
word is used with contrasting senses within a short section of text, it is difficult 
to believe that either the poet or any reasonably attentive sixteenth-century reader 
would not have noticed the word-play.
Terms relating to wind, breath, and spirit are often substituted for one another 
in the Sepmaine; these uses are striking because another term in the cluster of 
meanings would be more usual.89 However, the practice reaches a climax in this 
passage. Instead of using a similitude to distinguish clearly between the divine 
and the cosmic — as Calvin would no doubt have preferred — the poet seems to 
go out of his way to confuse the divine, the cosmic, and the human. An image 
which initially referred to God’s spirit and its divine manifestation in man comes 
to represent human and cosmic phenomena: not only man’s divine spirit but also 
the air in his body, wind, and the scent of the rose. Du Bartas uses vent repeatedly 
within a short section of text and, in its different appearances, it shifts between 
various divine, human and cosmic meanings, making it difficult to differentiate 
between them (even if a reader were to undertake a careful and systematic close 
reading as I have above), and increasing the sense of their similarity. Thus the 
relations of similarity and difference between the cosmic, the human and the divine 
appear to be complex.
In the case of breath, the image of vent is almost a ‘dead metaphor’ in the sixteenth 
century, whereas the comparison between the soul and the vent is more striking; 
however, the repetition of vent in different contexts ‘re-vivifies’ all these uses. It 
invites the reader to consider in each case how ‘proper’ the term vent might be, 
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and to consider how similar or different the divine, human and cosmic vents might 
be. Thus the play upon various divine and human meanings of vent constitutes a 
way in which the poet indirectly explores the questions of similarity and difference 
between the human and the divine which he also brief ly addresses explicitly in the 
gloss upon Genesis 2.7.90
Du Bartas’s word-play suggests that whether a term is proper or not is a question 
of degree rather than absolute distinctions, and — furthermore — is often not a 
closed question but rather an open one. A related point is fairly commonplace in 
the twenty-first century: the notion that all language is metaphorical, and that some 
metaphors are simply more ‘dead’ than others. However, Du Bartas’s concern is 
related to the special case of thinking about God and about how God is imaged in 
the world; highlighting imagistic language has different implications when there is 
a possibility that images exist which are ontological or real. Where Calvin insisted 
that there was something proper about some images but that the difference between 
the divine and the cosmic or human image should also be borne in mind, Du Bartas 
prefers to question (indirectly) the degree of difference which seems to inhere 
in particular images. The passage suggests that in this context the relationship 
between the proper and the symbolic cannot be thought of in terms of antithesis: 
for example, ‘breath’ is ‘proper’ to describe emission from a human mouth but in a 
sense is also ‘proper’ to describe God’s ‘breath’.91
Du Bartas uses images in exploratory ways, sometimes affirming them, sometimes 
denying them, and sometimes varying them with contrasting implications for the 
relationships between the human, the cosmic, and the divine. The poet thereby 
prompts his readers to consider the status and function of images, and the ways in 
which they are employed to approach knowledge of the divine. He poses questions 
about the use of images in general, and also about particular images, notably that 
of the wind. Like natural-theological writers, Du Bartas indicates that the cosmos 
provides imagistic evidence for a Christian cosmos. However, he also suggests 
that the degree of similarity thus implied between the natural and the divine is 
uncertain, and can be investigated through a complicated use of linguistic images. 
In other words, the poet both emphasizes similarities and also explores and plays 
with them. Thus Du Bartas manipulates the poetic and imagistic particularities of 
his genre and style in order to make a distinctive contribution towards the mass 
of sixteenth-century thinking about the relationship between the divine and the 
cosmos, between God and images of him.
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